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Abstract 
Lan Nguyen (M.S.  , Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEISMIC HAZARD VULNERABILITY AND 
STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  ILLUSTRATION FOR THREE 
COUNTRIES. 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Ross B. Corotis. 
 
This thesis investigates the underlying relationship between the implicit level of risk accepted for 
natural hazard vulnerability, and the level of economic, social and political development of the 
country.  In particular, it reports on a study of seismic hazard and code development/enforcement 
for three countries at very different levels of development, illustrated through a case study.  
Haiti, Chile, and New Zealand all experienced major earthquakes in 2010.  The loss of life and 
devastation in Haiti, however, was much worse than in Chile and New Zealand, despite the 
magnitude of the earthquake being smaller. 
The aim of this study is to compare the differences among the three events, as well as 
comment on some of the social aspects that led to the conditions at the time of the earthquakes.  
Variables considered are: magnitude of earthquake, depth of hypocenter, local geological 
conditions, demographics of the population, population at risk in the area of the earthquake, and 
performance of structures in the affected areas.  Vulnerability information is also related to the 
seismic provisions of the building codes, and the atmosphere of code enforcement.  Damage has 
been and is continuing to be investigated by several countries concerning the loss of lives, injury, 
property damage, and how well various structures have performed in these three countries. 
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This study reports on the connection between the performance of structures and the 
quality and enforcement of existing building codes in the respective countries.  This is 
accomplished through a review of current and prior building codes, a comparison of the codes to 
that of the United States, and the standard practice of inspection or enforcement of codes during 
construction.  Recognizing the differing degree of economic development and societal needs, and 
considering the international contributions of aid, the question of mandatory code development 
and enforcement is considered. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 The Need for Hazards Risk Management 
Environmental risk or disaster events have caused significant exposure to human vulnerability 
from many forms of natural hazards.  Even to a country that is not subjected to natural hazards, 
there are also risks in daily exposure dangers such as the surrounding environment, political and 
economic performance, and the health of its society.  Engineers are required to manifest their 
studying by researching and making decisions that affect society.  Along with scientists, business 
leaders and politicians, they bring community development forward.  To be able to mitigate risks 
from natural hazard effects, engineers first need to understand the roots of cause, the possibility 
of occurrence, and the magnitude of the natural hazards.  In addition, mitigation requires 
identifying which factors determine the vulnerability within the community.   
Since the scope of vulnerability itself is complex and contains many aspects, it is 
essential to know the connection between each component as well as the possible weakness in 
each component.  Because of all the community aspects that are subject to engineering decisions, 
especially planning actions regarding human vulnerability, understanding risk is essential.  To 
facilitate a concise, valuable, and meaningful approach in mitigating risk, the engineer has to 
thoroughly comprehend the society, identify the weakest features within the society, and be 
capable of finding an appropriate resolution to address those features.  Accordingly, to a 
community as a whole, along with social scientists, the engineer has to foresee the area‘s highest 
potential risk, determine the impact of the risk to those areas, and plan the best solution to 
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provide recovery to areas that could be impacted.  The tasks of engineers and social scientists 
associated with the concept of risk management are numerous.  Challenge in risk management 
with respect to natural hazards is that the engineer must act appropriately prior to an event, at the 
time of a disaster, and after the occurrence.  At each point of time in the situation, engineers‘ acts 
are needed to perform and adjust in the most precise, effective, and valuable way. 
Increase in population and urbanization has led to a rise of human vulnerability exposure.  
This has led an increase around the world to the costs associated with natural hazards.  Reducing 
human vulnerability requires understanding risk and the ability to measure risk, not only in 
theory or concept, but also in a quantifiable way.  This charge involves engineers providing more 
than technology or equipment, it also requires the knowledge of risk and the capability to educate 
the community, as well as construct a preparation plan so that costs from natural hazards can be 
reduced.  Available information surrounding natural hazards and the community are the valuable 
tools for engineers to develop an approach to deal with risk in all manners of circumstance.  
1.2 Motivation and Objectives  
The catastrophic damage that resulted from the earthquake in Haiti touched the whole world and 
led to a great recognition by people about how much damage could have been avoided through 
the use of risk management.  Certainly, if people had been aware of the risk and taken 
appropriate precautions prior the earthquake in Haiti, the amount of loss would have been much 
less devastating.  More than just providing the technology, aid, and money to help the country, 
the world expressed a desire to understand a complete picture of Haiti.  The author‘s attitude of 
frustration toward Haiti‘s helpless settlement condition brought about the determination of 
studying Haiti.  The subsequent earthquakes in Chile and New Zealand brought a desire to study 
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their situations and extract valuable lessons for Haiti.  Together with many researchers who have 
studied Haiti, , the author hopes this research will contribute to a better understanding of the 
steps necessary for Haiti to become a more earthquake-resilient society.  From an engineering 
point of view, it is crucial to find such a manifest way to mitigate risk to which Haiti is exposed, 
so that the impact and the cost from natural hazards will no longer have such a large effect on the 
country. 
Environmental risks are the product of physical pressures in the form of environmental 
hazards, and human vulnerability (Pellings, 2003).  Focusing on the ability to control human 
vulnerability, this research emphasizes the concept of resilience capacity, one of the components 
of human vulnerability.  Resilience capacity in a society plays an important role in managing 
risk.  Resilience is an ability to overcome the hazard stress and to recover after the stress.  
Resilience in each country depends upon social, political, and economic history.  Because of that 
reliance, the performance of each country after a natural hazard (an earthquake in this case) will 
be studied, so that a full picture of the accepted risk level can be viewed.  Understanding the 
whole picture, including the related aspects of resilience which contribute to the development of 
both a community on a small scale and a country on a larger scale is essential and practical to 
any societal activist, and especially to an engineer. 
1.3 Scope and organization 
The level of risk acceptance is different in each of the countries studied.  This led to a 
requirement to study many different factors.  Various aspects of vulnerability are identified, 
especially those that impact the community.  History of vulnerability and environmental hazards 
are reviewed, as well as many social vulnerability adaptations.  A framework surrounding 
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consequences of natural hazards is analyzed, including the involvement of exposure, resistance, 
and resilience, which combine to form vulnerability.  This research studies the three countries of 
Haiti, Chile, and New Zealand over a period of time of more than ten years so that a 
representation of the trajectory of the society as a whole could be obtained.  In addition, the 
relationship between the social structure and contributed activity is studied.  Structure 
performance and code enforcement prior to and after the occurrence of the natural disaster is 
described in order to obtain the overall view of which aspects are involved in defining a 
reconstruction plan. 
Chapter 2 includes a summary of the overall picture of Haiti after the earthquake, 
including damage cost, exposure cities, and structural damages.  A study of natural hazards 
which occurred in the past and the damages caused is also presented.  Haiti in this part is 
presented as an example of a developing country which suffered from many factors including 
social, political, and economical circumstances.  Along with the history of natural hazards this 
chapter presents comments with respect to the country‘s preparation toward the historical risk.  
An overall representation of Haiti will be captured which reflects the pure exposure vulnerability 
toward risk.  A brief definition of risk will be discussed as well. 
Chapter 3 describes Chile, which is considered a gap bridging Haiti and New Zealand.  
Chile was subjected to an earthquake about two months after Haiti.  Despite the magnitude of the 
earthquake being much larger in Chile, the damage in terms of loss of life was much less.  The 
acceptable risk level in Chile under its risk mitigation plan is also discussed.  The outline for this 
chapter is somewhat similar to the previous chapter, although the focus is further specified in 
building code and enforcement.  This chapter reveals the overall country differences between 
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Haiti and Chile, and also discussed the differences between Chile and the United States in terms 
of building code and enforcement system. 
Chapter 4 provides a distinction of the levels of risk acceptance among the three 
countries.  Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter focuses more on emphasizing the code used within 
the country, as well as the differences with Chile and the United States.  The discussion in this 
chapter highlights the preparation plan in New Zealand and the achievement of mitigating risk, 
causing a positive impact such that public safety is enhanced.  New Zealand is described as an 
example of hazard resistance with the use of a new building code application.  Updated 
conditions in New Zealand after it was subjected to the new earthquake in 2011 are listed. In 
addition, comments on the new earthquake are offered to best present the human vulnerability 
reduction toward natural hazard risks.  Since the damage caused by the two earthquakes in New 
Zealand mainly was to unreinforced masonry structures and non-structural components, another 
aspect of discussion is viewed particularly in this subject.  It is the consideration of a seismic 
area in California that is subjected to the rule regarding unreinforced masonry structures.  The 
purpose of viewing the regulatory requirements is so that one can observe the differences 
corresponding to each individual country and thus quantify which changes might be made for 
unreinforced masonry structures in Chile and Haiti.   
Chapter 5 is a case study about an engineered structure that survived the earthquake in 
Haiti.  Structural behavior during the earthquake is analyzed and will be used for further design 
in term of retrofitting.  The comparison will be based on the two distinct conditions: (1) using the 
old evaluation approach and (2) using the current available seismic provision code.  Overall 
strengthening recommendations will be made to satisfy the safety requirements for a structure 
located in a seismic area. 
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Chapter 6 analyzes available information as well as provides potential measurements 
which could quantify the risk and the cost from risk.  The relationship of economy and level of 
accepted risk will be presented in graphical display.  The ideas behind these relationships will be 
presented.  Damage during an earthquake in particular, or natural hazards in general, will be 
related to these ideas as well.  Resilience in terms of each country‘s economic development 
during recovery from the earthquake will be discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 summaries the analysis from Chapter 6, gathers all the recommendations for 
the paper, and concludes the overall remarks of the paper.  Environmental risk itself is complex 
and difficult to understand, and subsequently, being able to offer recommendations to strengthen 
the framework and the operation of controlling risk is no less problematic.  Therefore, the 
chapter also recommends future research which targets enhancing and filling in the aspects 
surrounding human vulnerability other than the primary focuses of economic, social, political, 
and building enforcement features.  Overall, the needs for natural hazard risk management will 
be summarized, and the areas which involve these needs will also be mentioned.  Resilience 
capacity within the society will be drawn as a simple path, there will be assumptions regarding 
this path, and its future behavior.  A conclusion for this paper will remark on the overall picture; 
it will identify the main factors and solutions for those factors that played such crucial roles in 
society resilience and human vulnerability. 
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Chapter 2  
Haiti- An example of a developing country 
Introduction  
On January 12
th
, 2010 a magnitude Mw 7.0 earthquake hit Haiti, causing major deaths, injuries 
and property damage.  The amount of damage and the current suffering brought international 
attention.  Beyond sympathy, research and analysis of the event and the sources of damage has 
been and are still currently taking place.  To understand the circumstances surrounding the 2010 
earthquake and ways to implement a policy to rebuild the country, one must be aware of the 
history of the event, the natural hazards that happened in the past, demographics, and social, 
economic and political history of the country itself. 
2.1 The Earthquake 2010 
2.1.1 History of event 
The earthquake that struck Haiti happened at 04:53 PM local time (21:53 Coordinated Universal 
Time (UTC)).  The main shock epicenter was located about 25 km west-southwest of the city of 
Port-au Prince, 130 km east of Les Cayes, 150 km South of Cap-Haitien in Haiti and 1125 km 
south-east of Miami, Florida as shown in Figure 2-1.  Within two weeks after the primary shock, 
there were 59 aftershocks with magnitudes 4.5 or greater (USGS, 2010a).   
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2.1.2 Seismological aspects 
2.1.2.1 Geography and tectonic plates 
The Republic of Haiti occupies the western third (27,750 km
2
) of the island of Hispaniola, 
located in the northeast Caribbean between Puerto Rico to the east and Jamaica and Cuba to the 
west (Fig. 2-2b).  Haiti has a total population of approximately 9 million.  Its largest city, Port-
au-Prince, has an estimated population of between 2.5 and 3 million people within the 
metropolitan area and is located 25 km ENE of the epicenter as shown in Figure 2-2a on the left. 
 
Figure 2-2. a. Map of Haiti (USGS, 2010). Figure b. Geographical setting of the island of 
Hispaniola (USGS, 2010a). 
(Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/pager/events/us/2010rja6/index.html) 
2.1.2.2 Seismology 
The earthquake happened in the boundary region which separates the Caribbean plate and the 
North America plate.  Movement was characterized as left-lateral strike slip, and compression 
 Figure 2-1.  Location of Haiti's earthquake epicenter. 
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between these two plates was about 20 mm per year slip.  The Caribbean plate moved eastward 
with respect to the North America plate (USGS, 2010a).  The epicenter of the earthquake 
occurred at 18.443°N, 72.  571°W, with the estimated hypocenter depth at 13 km below the 
surface, but this figure is uncertain due to a lack of a seismography station in the region during 
the main earthquake.  The location of the epicenter has a horizontal uncertainty of ± 3.4 km(2.1 
miles) (USGS, 2010a).   
On September 20
th
, 2010, it was found by the researcher Brett Israel, the Mw 7.0 
earthquake indeed involved not only one, but three faults including the newly discovered 
Léogâne fault, which contributed 85 percent of the energy released during the January 2010 
earthquake.  The movement of these three faults warped the ocean floor and caused a tsunami 
and unusual chain of aftershock events (Israel, 2010).   
2.1.3 Strength of earthquake 
In the elastic rebound theory in the book Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering, Kramer 
describes about the slow deformation of rock and building up process of strain energy stored.  
Once the strength of the rock exceeded, rupture happens and strain energy is released.  A 
measurement of work done by an earthquake is called the seismic moment (Mo) and it is given 
by Equation 1.3-1. 
           (Eq. 2.1.3-1) 
Where: μ is the rupture strength of the material along the fault, A is the rupture area, and D is the 
average amount of slip.   
So Mo is the measure of work done by the earthquake which is correlates well with the energy 
released during an earthquake (Kramer, page 42). 
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Moment magnitude (Mw)—a measurement of the strength of an earthquake—is given by 
Equation 1.3-2. (Kramer, page 42) 
   
     
   
         (Eq. 2.1.3-2) 
Using Equations 1.3-1 and 1.3-2, the seismic moment of the January 2010 earthquake is: 
            
             (Eq. 2.1.3-3) 
Therefore, the energy released in this earthquake is 3.55 x 10
26
 dyne cm which is 
equivalent to about half of a million tons of the chemical explosive Trinitrotoluene (TNT) 
(USGS calculation tool, 2010). 
2.1.4 Population at risk and affected 
Over nine million people live in Haiti.  More than 1.5 million people were directly affected by 
the earthquake, which was more than 15% of the population of the entire country.  The number 
of recorded casualties exceeded 222,570, and the number of injuries was over 300,000.  In 
addition, at least four people were killed by a local tsunami in the Petit Paradis area near 
Léogâne.  The official death toll plotted in Figure 2-3c showed that the January 2010 earthquake 
was more than twice as lethal as any previous magnitude-7.0 event occurring in the world 
(Bilham, 2010).  Even ten months after the earthquake, there are still 1.3 million people now 
living in temporary shelters (United Nations, 2010).  The intensity maps and the affected 
population from the earthquake were captured by USGS 2010, shown in Figure 2-3a, and 2-3b 
below.  As seen in Figure 2-3b, the number of effected population in Port-au-Prince was 
1,235,000 people.  This number is almost 50 % population of the entire city. 
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Figure 2-3. a. Earthquake intensity in Haiti.3b. Effected population (USGS, 2010)3c. 
Haiti’s death toll (Roger, 2010) 
The earthquake affected segments of the country and its society beyond the area that felt 
the physical effects of the earthquake.  In addition to the massive loss of life in the country, there 
was also a tremendous loss of knowledge, skill, and other social fabric that will certainly affect 
the country for years to come.  Since earthquake, approximately 150,000 people left the country, 
and at least 600,000 people abandoned the damaged urban areas to find shelter in the rural areas 
of the country.  This surge in the rural population place a lot of strain to the food supply as well 
as services provided in these parts of the country (EERI, 2010a).  Even if the urban areas are 
rebuilt, it is not evident that these people would ever return to the city (EERI, 2010a) 
2.1.5 Amount of damage 
The Haitian government estimates that the damage caused by the earthquake was approximately 
$7.8 billion, which is more than 120 percent of Haiti‘s 2009 gross domestic product (EERI, 
2010a and CIA, 2010).  This dollar amount was primarily based on the number of dwellings lost 
in the earthquake: 105,000 homes were completely destroyed and more than 208,000 were 
damaged.  In Port-au-Prince, about 25 km away from the rupture location, the quake caused 
about 80% of all schools to collapse.  Port-au-Prince had also been the center of economic 
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activity. It had the highest number of jobs in the country, and the city generated 85% of the 
government‘s revenue.  After the earthquake, many jobs were lost, and unemployment increased 
up to 75 % (EERI, 2010a).  The earthquake also destroyed over 80% of the buildings in Léogâne, 
the city located nearest the epicenter.  In the entire country, approximately 1,300 educational 
institutions and over 50 medical centers and hospitals collapsed or were damaged; and 13 out of 
15 key government buildings were severely damaged (EERI, 2010a).  The number and severity 
of damaged buildings and structures were indications of Haiti‘s deficiencies in the area of 
building code and enforcement. 
2.2 Building and Code Enforcement 
Buildings in Haiti can be divided into two categories:  those built between 1800 and 1920, and 
those built from 1920 to the present.  The buildings constructed during the time between 1800 
and 1920 are categorized as historic buildings.  They are: timber frame, unreinforced masonry 
and reinforced concrete buildings.   
2.2.1 Buildings from 1800 to 1920 
In general, timber frame buildings performed well under the seismic load (EERI, 2010a).  In 
Bois Verna, a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, 200 wooden houses known as ‗gingerbread‘ 
houses withstood the earthquake shown in Figure 2-4a below (Bradley, 2010).  Wood buildings 
in these types of timber frame structures are light and flexible, with diagonal members and 
interior wooden planks spanning horizontally across the wall framing, providing lateral structural 
strength.  In many cases, however, serious damage was caused due to the deterioration of wood 
members from termites or rot, thus weakening the members.   
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Figure 2-4. a.  Gingerbread wooden house (Badley, 2010).  4b.  Unreinforced masonry 
building( Hammer, 2010) 
Unreinforced masonry failed under the earthquake load, with damage ranging from 
diagonal cracking in wall sections to collapse (see Figure 2-4b).  Failures can be attributed to the 
lack of brick ties or brick headers between brick wythes, lack of reinforcement, weak stone at 
critical points, poor quality due to poor aggregate quality, inadequate cement or lime, and poor 
maintenance.   
Reinforced concrete structures adopted European styles.  One of these architectural 
features was the heavy domes found on top of buildings.  Rigid first floors and massive concrete 
dome roofs caused the second floor to act as a soft story.  This is the case of failure in both the 
National Presidential Palace and National Cathedral.  (EERI, 2010a) 
2.2.2 Buildings from 1900 to present 
From 1900 to the present, the early generation Haitian engineers and architects were educated in 
France, were familiar with the French building design code (AFNOR and Benton Arme aux Etas 
Limites (BAEL)) which does not include any of the seismic provision.  While there were laws in 
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books requiring building permits and inspections, it appeared these were neither followed or 
enforced (Fouche, 2010). 
Structures designed by Hatian engineers as reinforced concrete and reinforced masonry 
were also built with infill masonry.  Infill masonry structures suffered damage at the infill walls 
and surrounding columns.  In these engineered building types, smooth reinforcing bars were 
used, and widely spaced, particularly in columns (EERI, 2010a).  The seismic behavior of infill 
masonry is still currently under analysis in structural research, but it is understood that this type 
of structure has no tensile or bending resistance; therefore, overturning and out of plane failure 
was common and caused the majority of collapses.   
The important considerations are that limited engineering knowledge is transferred, there 
is an absence of building code and record keeping, and there is widespread uncontrolled and 
unenforced construction practice.  Seismic designed application was up to individual initiative 
and not subject to the consensus or oversight of the government (EERI, 2010a). 
The main factors involved in the tragic loss of life during the 2010 Haiti earthquake were 
that buildings were neither designed nor constructed to resist earthquakes.  Observations have 
shown that those buildings that were designed to resist seismic loads performed well.  
Additionally, low quality materials and lack of inspections and quality control compounded the 
severe damage magnitude under the earthquake.  Historic patterns of prior earthquakes in the 
area predict that earthquake with an even larger magnitude could happen any time.  This 
knowledge should be used along with help from the international community when rebuilding 
Port-au-Prince to develop and enforce proper design and construction practices for Haiti‘s 
structures.  
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In the next section, Haiti‘s social, economic and political history is reviewed.  Knowing 
the history of the country can help explain the circumstances the country is in and can provide a 
basis on developing a policy to be used in rebuilding the country.   
2.3 Social, economic and political considerations  
Haiti is located in the Western Hemisphere and is surrounded by the Caribbean Sea, the Golfe 
De la Gonave, and the Atlantic Ocean.  It covers 10,714 square miles (27,750 square kilometers). 
The neighboring islands include Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico.  The population of Haiti has 
grown steadily from 431,140 at its independence in 1804 to an estimated 6.9 to 7.2 million in 
2000, making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world.  In the 1970s, over 
80% of the population resided in rural areas.  However today, over 60% continue to live across 
the rural landscape.  The other 30% live in the capital city, Port-au-Prince, which is over five 
times larger than the next biggest city, Cape Haitian (CIA, 2010).  
Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere.  GDP of the country as a whole 
was 11.99 billion US dollars and 1,300 US dollars per capita in 2009 (CIA, 2010).  Over the past 
five years, the economy of Haiti grew slowly with the small annual percentage of 2.3% from 
2004 to 2009 after a decline of 0.7% from 2000 to 2004 as shown in Figure 2-5 (US Department 
of State, 2010).  Despite of this small recent improvement, the occurrence of the 2010 earthquake 
put Haiti in a positon of ecomomy crisis.  This economic situation combined with natural hazards 
in the form of earthquakes and hurricanes places Haiti in a unique and difficult position.  Both 
economic problems and natural hazards have amplified the exposure of Haiti to risk.  A concern 
is the degree to which this level of poverty and lack of social and economical resources increases 
the amount of risk the government is willing to place on its citizens.  An unanswered question is 
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whether the devastation that the citizens of the country experienced changes the acceptability of 
this risk to human life. 
 
             Figure 2-5.  Haiti growth rate from 2007 to 2009 
Another factor that has challenged Haiti has been its political environment.  Ever since 
the country won its independence from France in 1804, Haiti has been plagued with economic 
instability and political corruption.  There have been 55 leaders of Haiti since the country won its 
independence, but only nine of them were able to complete their presidential terms.  The 
remaining leaders died during their terms, were killed, or were forced out of office (Buss, 2008).  
Many of these leaders were reported to have taken advantage of their citizens and the island‘s 
natural resources for personal and political gain.  Citizens were often aware of this, and as a 
result, there were few times in the country‘s history when there was peace and stability (Buss, 
2008).   
Another concern is that earthquakes are not the only natural hazards to strike Haiti.  In 
the past, Haiti has suffered hurricanes and tropical storms, briefly covered in the next section.  
This history is important because as the country regularly experiences these disasters, but no 
building codes are established and enforced to protect the people, one asks what the Haitian 
government‘s priorities truly are.  Perhaps these decisions are the result of the government‘s 
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limited knowledge of seismic structural design or its willingness to assume a high level of risk 
due to competing economic factors for limited resources.  An important question is whether 
some of the financial aid promised Haiti should be required to be used for seismic code 
development and enforcement for the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince and its environs.  
2.4 History of Earthquakes and Other Natural Nazards  
2.4.1 Earthquake history 
Since 1964, the southern Port-au-Prince region of Haiti only experienced one earthquake with 
magnitude greater than 4.0, with several additional events occurring 100 km to the west (USGS, 
2010a).  Large earthquakes happened in Haiti in 1701, 1751, 1770, and 1860.  The 1770 
earthquake resulted in the widespread destruction of buildings in Port-au-prince and Léogâne and 
was estimated to be about 30-50 km to the west of the Enriquillo fault, which was first believed 
to be the same fault that produced the 2010 earthquake.  The 1860 earthquake was located farther 
west of Port au Prince, and also was observed to cause uplift of the sea floor.  Thus this 
particular area of Haiti has experienced a well documented history of large earthquakes (USGS, 
2011a).   
2.4.2 Tropical storms and hurricane 
Within the past fifteen years, Haiti underwent tropical storms, hurricanes, and other types of 
natural hazards.  Table 2-1 below lists the loss of life that Haiti endured and the environmental 
damage after the natural hazards. 
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Year Hurricane Death toll 
Environmental 
damage 
1994 Hurricane Gordon More than 1000 deaths 
Washed off 96% of 
forest 
1998 Hurricane Georges More than 400 deaths 
Destroyed 80% of 
crop 
2004 Hurricane Jeanne More than 3000 deaths 
Destroyed 70% of 
urban infrastructure 
(crop, houses, etc) 
on the West side of 
Port-au-Prince. 
2008 
Hurricane Fay, Gustay, Hanna 
and Ike 
 Destroyed 70% crop More than 793 deaths 
 Table 2-1.  Natural hazards in Haiti from 2004 to 2008 
Source:http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/AMMF-
82SVYU?OpenDocument&rc=2&emid=TC-2004-000098 
Clearly, the impact of natural hazards on Haiti‘s economy is considerable.  Haiti 
constantly deals with the results of these influences.  How can a country recover when it must 
defend itself from seemingly nonstop disasters?  Such events constantly remind us that Haiti is 
not immune to the force of nature, which is directly associated with risk to the country‘s 
communities. In addition, these events showed that the threat to health and livelihood from 
natural disasters continued adding to Haiti‘s exposure in a dynamic way.  The damage from these 
natural hazards caused the decaying conditions of soil, forests, and land usage.  But how deep do 
these causes of risk go and to what extent are shared patterns of risk generation amenable to 
common policy response?  This is a critical question for Haiti‘s government or authorities.  Some 
dialogue and possible answers to this question are offered in the following discussions. 
As seen in the previous sections of this paper, when disasters struck the country, the 
effects were catastrophic.  But what factors actually determine the vulnerability of the country 
and its people?  To answer this question, one must be aware of risk and the literature on disasters 
as well as their impacts on society. 
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2.5 Risk- Risk Management 
Because disaster studies often involve multiple disciplines, words often have compound 
implications.  Table 2-2 provides definitions for some key terms (Pelling, 2003) 
Key Terminology 
Risk 
To be threaten by harm.  To be at risk is to be under threat of 
harm. 
Hazard 
The potential to harm individual or human systems.  In this 
work, hazard is ascribed to natural, physical or environmental 
elements.  It can be everyday (scarcity of clean drinking water 
or episodic). 
Vulnerability 
Denotes exposure to risk and an inability to avoid or absorb 
potential harm. 
Physical Vulnerability Vulnerability in built environment. 
Social Vulnerability 
Vulnerability experienced by people and their social, economic 
and political systems. 
Human Vulnerability The combination of physical and social vulnerability 
Resilience 
The capacity to adjust to threats and mitigate or avoid harm. 
Resilience can be found in hazard-resistant building or adaptive 
social systems. 
Disaster 
The outcome of hazard and vulnerability coinciding.  Disaster 
is a state of disruption to systemic functions. System operates 
at variety of scales, from individuals' biological and 
psychological constitutions or local socio-economies to urban 
infrastructure networks and the global political economy. 
Table 2-2.  Key terminology (Mark Pelling, 2003). 
2.5.1 The earthquake 2010 and its reminder of risk 
The January 2010 earthquake reminded both the world and Haiti about the existence of risk and 
Haiti‘s predispositions to risk.  This earthquake shows that the exposure to risk has gotten worse 
for a country faced with many disasters throughout its history.  Risk has always existed, but, as 
evident in this earthquake, the Haitians lack understanding of what these potential risks are.  This 
ignorance could be a result of the country being under-developed.  Haitians need to understand 
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that the risk they have faced in the past—combined with their ignorance—placed a burden to 
both their own development and the resources of the countries trying to aid them in their 
recovery.  
2.5.2 Haiti’s Disasters 
2.5.2.1 Natural disaster 
Earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, tropical storms, droughts, and landslides are all natural 
hazards to which Haiti is vulnerable.  Haiti‘s geology and the natural and built characteristics of 
its surrounding environment largely produced the exposure to risk.  Inadequate preparation for 
natural disasters has a direct effect on the income and economy of a country, and has an even 
bigger impact if loss of life occurs.  Planning in advance for these natural hazards is a feasible 
way to help people, reduce the loss of life and the expense of recuperation and reconstruction.  
Planning for natural disasters is a need for Haiti as significant as response to the natural disasters.  
Unfortunately, what to do and how to prepare natural hazards are never covered in primary and 
secondary schools, and the opportunities for adults to receive information and training on the 
subject are rare (NATHAT, 2010).  There may be an opportunity to change this manner toward 
risk so that Haitians can be educated and equipped with the attitude of facing natural hazards. 
2.5.2.2 Human Vulnerability 
It is always essential to understand nature of hazards, but the influence of social component is as 
important as the natural hazard itself.  Creation of a dense population, a lack of adequate building 
standards, a lack of the enforcement of the code, the catastrophic state of environment, 
disorganized land use, and an unbalanced division of economic activity are all factors that 
increase social and physical susceptibilities to disasters.  These social factors can get worse with 
time if there is no improvement.  The relationship between these social factors and the risk 
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exposure are proportional—the devastation a community could encounter after a disaster 
increase if these social and physical vulnerabilities are not properly identified and dealt with. 
2.5.2.3 Disaster 
It is important to note that a community‘s susceptibilities to a disaster are the result of both 
nature and human activity (Pelling, 2003).  The distinguishing characteristic of risk is that 
climatic and seismic hazards cannot be prevented.  Fortunately, human vulnerabilities—factors 
that the people themselves cause—can be minimized (Lou Zoback et al., 2010).  Haiti has many 
of these vulnerabilities that need to be addressed, and help is needed to solve the problems 
brought forth by these factors.  The question is how can we address these vulnerabilities, and 
what specific parts should resources be concentrated toward?  Most of the components in human 
vulnerability can be organized into three categories:  land reform or population density 
organization with economic growth and job creation, development a standard code for structures 
along with enforcement, and preparation for the response to natural hazard.  All three of these 
factors require extensive combined involvement and coordination of politics, social sciences, and 
engineering in order for Haiti to be more resilient to disasters. 
2.5.3 Response to natural hazard 
Identifying the threats from natural disasters is complicated, and distinguishing between threats 
to life and livelihood from natural disasters and other sources is even harder.  Awareness of 
natural hazards and a plan of response is as significant as reducing the human vulnerability itself.   
The struggle of daily survival for the people of Haiti is heavily-pronounced in this 
impoverished country.  These struggles divert attention away from getting an organized plan of 
disaster mitigation put in place.  Because of this diversion, the people needlessly suffer after a 
disaster: they are poor to begin with, and after a disaster, they become poorer and more helpless.  
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It is true that the magnitude of a natural hazard is often hard to predict, although its average 
frequency is possible to obtain.  If the awareness of natural hazards can be achieved, then 
subsequently, the human component to the exposure of risk can be reduced and the capacity of a 
community‘s resistance to risk can also be enhanced.  Activities that Haiti could possibly pursue 
include:  
o Offer special training at a special time schedule. 
o Prepare the service reserves to respond when an emergency happens. 
o Improve weather reports to include disaster preparedness. 
o Enhance the human resources of community activists and leaders. 
o Increase group leaders‘ awareness, skills, and external resources in order to 
increase the effectiveness of their roles. 
o Improve communication from government leaders to local communities. 
2.6 Summary 
Of all the challenges faced by the Haitian people, risk management is the most complex.  There 
are small signs of recovery in Haiti as evident from the day to day moving of debris, organization 
of shelters, and business slowly reopening (Economist, 2011).  Yet, Haiti‘s revival still needs 
time and extra help from countries around the world.  Since natural hazards will always exist as a 
threat to the country, Haiti needs a plan to rebuild, reorganize, and prepare their country.  
Rehabilitation of Haiti‘s people and repairing the country‘s critical infrastructure is their first 
priority.  Once the people are adequately secured, the country can then concentrate their 
resources in disaster mitigation.  For this to occur, the Haitians are required to combine their 
effort to help revitalize their country for their own sake.   
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Chapter 3  
Chile- an example of developed country  
In order for Haiti to move forward after this disaster, they must learn a few lessons from other 
countries that have previously dealt with similar disasters.  It is vital for them to know not only 
the similarities of risks these countries share, but also the differences in how these countries react 
to them.  In general, if potential problems are known and planned for in a community, then the 
negative consequences brought forth by these risks are reduced.  Of course, after a disaster, 
damages and loss of life are expected; however, they would be minimized if the community is 
properly aware of these risks and enacts plans to deal with them.  Two countries—Chile and 
New Zealand—will be examined in subsequent parts of this paper.   
Even though Chile and New Zealand are developed countries, they share the same risks 
of seismic vulnerability with Haiti.  However, these two developed countries react to the risks 
very differently from Haiti, and disaster mitigation and preparedness actions are taken seriously 
in these two countries.  Each country will be investigated and conclusions made on how Haiti 
can implement a similar program on disaster mitigation.  First, Chile‘s experience is represented 
here as a case study of a kind of community that is resilient to environmental hazard.  The 
following section will center on disaster mitigation in Chile.  Key differences between Haiti and 
Chile will be highlighted, and conclusions will be drawn on what lessons Haiti can take from 
Chile. 
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Introduction  
Despite the large magnitude of the earthquake, the number of deaths, injuries, and buildings 
damaged were considerably less than Haiti—a country that experienced a smaller earthquake but 
has no seismic code (Bailey, 2010).  Chile‘s actual damage amount in dollars was estimated to be 
higher than in Haiti because of the existence of more modern buildings and infrastructure.  Chile 
is considered as a First World country, which means it is a developed and economically 
advanced country.  The government of Chile recognizes the seismic threat and enforces a strict 
building code called the NCH 433 (1996) (Harris, 2010).  This code was designed based on the 
survival of buildings after an Mw 8.0 earthquake devastated Santiago in March 1985 (Mohlle, 
2010).   
The intent of seismic building codes is to prevent damage in small and moderate 
earthquakes, but to tolerate some damages in large earthquakes such as the one that struck 
Santiago last February: the intent, after all, is to protect human life by preventing collapse of the 
infrastructure (EERI, 2010b).  The 2010 earthquake had a moment magnitude of 8.8, which was 
larger than the design earthquake considered in the code.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
damages occurred.  Because of the economic status of the country, one would expect that Chile 
has the ability to reduce future earthquake losses in terms of both lives and economics by further 
updating and improving its seismic building code.  Beside the view of social and political 
history, other goals of this section are to summarize the damage of concrete and masonry 
buildings, damage to the nonstructural elements such as pipes and mechanical equipment, and to 
briefly identify the differences between Chile‘s code and that of the United States at the time of 
adoption (1996). 
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3.1 The earthquake 2010 
3.1.1 History of event 
On February 27, 2010, an earthquake with magnitude Mw 8.8 hit the central region of Chile.  
The main tremor occurred off the coast of the country at 3:34 am local time (6:34 UTC).  
Following the primary shock, over 300 aftershocks occurred with magnitudes of 5.0 or greater 
over the period of two months.  In fact, twenty-one of these were at magnitudes 6.0 or greater 
(USGS, 2010).  The epicenter of the 2010 earthquake was 105 km (65 miles) north-northwest of 
Conceptión off the coast of the country shown in Figure 3-1.  As the main earthquake occurred, 
the ocean floor warped and caused a destructive tsunami (Universidad de Chile, 2010).  The 
earthquake moved the city of Concepción three meters (ten feet) to the west of its previous 
location, and moved the capital, Santiago, about 28 centimeters (11 inches) to the west-southwest 
(AON Benfield, 2010).   
 
Figure 3-1.  Location of the epicenter in Chile earthquake. 
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3.1.2 Seismological aspects 
3.1.2.1 Geography and tectonic plates 
The types of earthquakes to which Chile is susceptible are those that typically occur at the 
subduction zones, as seen in Figure 3-2.  The subduction zones are known to produce the most 
powerful earthquakes on earth since the geological make-up of the subduction zone allows more 
stress to build up before the energy is released in the form of an earthquake (Hayes, 2009).  
 
Figure 3-2.  Cross- section of the subduction zone (Gerbault et al., 2009) 
Shown in Figure 3-3, the earthquake occurs at the boundary of two plates: the Narza Plate and 
the South American Plate, with the Narza plate moving eastward and sliding beneath the South 
American plate.  This 2010 earthquake was actually produced by the same fault and 230 km 
north from the epicenter of the historic 1960 earthquake (EERI, 2010b) 
 
Figure 3-3.  Subduction zone between the Nazca and South American plates (Schellart et 
al., 2007) 
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3.1.3 Seismology 
Chile is one of the most seismically active regions in the world.  A major earthquake with 
magnitude greater than 8.0 happens every fifteen year on average (USGS, 2010).  The largest 
earthquake ever recorded by seismic instrument with magnitude of Mw 9.5 occurred on May 12, 
1960, as shown in Table 3-1.   
On March 3, 1985, an earthquake with a moment magnitude of 8.0 struck the same 
region, causing millions of dollars of damage to buildings and infrastructure in Santiago, 
although only 177 people died in that earthquake (USGS, 1985).  The largest earthquake ever 
recorded in the world happened in Chile on May 22, 1960 with moment magnitude of 9.5 and 
killed approximately 2000 people in Southern Chile, Hawaii, Japan, and the Philippines (H. 
Carrol Talley, 1960).  In the 20
th
 century, over 75 earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 and higher 
struck Chile (Universidad de Chile, 2010) 
 
Table 3-1.  Chile's earthquakes from the past (USGS, 2010) 
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3.1.4 Strength of earthquake 
Using the same relationship as mentioned in Chapter 2, section 1.3, for       , one can 
calculate the work done by the earthquake is    1.77*10
29
 dyne-cm, which is equivalent to 
about 250 million tons of the chemical explosive Trinitrotoluene (TNT). 
3.1.5 Population at risk and affected 
The population density in Chile is much greater than in Haiti, and more than eight million people 
live in the area affected by the earthquake in Chile.  According to the Chile National Institute of 
Statistics, more than two million people live in the six regions directly affected by the 
earthquake: Tamuco, Concepcion, Talca, San Fernando, Valparaiso, and Santiago, as shown in 
Figure 3-4 (AON BenField, 2010).  The damage estimation is much higher in Chile than in Haiti: 
30 billion US dollars.  In contrast to Haiti, only 521 people in Chile died and 12,000 were injured 
from the earthquake and the resulting tsunami (USGS, 2010).   
 
Figure 3-4. Population affected (USGS, 2010). 
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3.1.6 Damage experienced 
There was also significant damage to buildings and infrastructure due to the Chile earthquake.  It 
damaged 370,000 houses, 4013 schools, and 79 hospitals (EERI, 2010b).  Among the damaged 
buildings, there were 54 constructed of reinforced concrete, of which four suffered total or partial 
collapse (EERI, 2010b).  Overall, there was a lot less disruption after the Chile earthquake, even 
though it was much more powerful than the Haiti earthquake.  
Not only were the buildings damaged by the earthquake, but there was also localized 
liquefaction that caused significant damage to buildings.  An example of building damage due to 
liquefaction and ground deformation is the hospital in Curanilahue.  The individual structural 
wings (ranging in height from 1 to 6 stories) experienced settlement and rotation due to 
liquefaction (EERI, 2010b).  The Rieso building experienced 30 cm settlement.  Some homes in 
the northern region of Concepción were torn completely apart by the lateral ground movement 
(EERI, 2010b). 
3.2 Social, economic and political considerations  
Chile shared one thing with Haiti with regard to their political histories: both countries 
experienced political instability that negatively affected their citizens.  In the case of Chile, their 
government first metamorphosed from a Parliamentary Republic into a Presidential Republic in 
the early part of the 20
th
 century.  At the turn of the 20
th
 century, Chile‘s parliament was 
controlled by a ruling oligarchy which exerted power over the democratically-elected president.  
For instance, the president was required to appoint his cabinet members based on who was the 
ruling party in parliament.  The oligarchy began to lose their influence over the country in the 
1920‘s.  There was a time where there was great political instability, for in the years 1924 to 
1931 a military coup ruled the country.  After 1931, the powers of the government shifted from 
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the parliament to the president.  At first, Chile was able to resist both fascism and socialism.  
However, as time progressed, Chillan politics began to be more polarized.  For the next forty 
years, presidents either pushed the country to the left or to the right.  Thanks to an ever-
polarizing political party system, the government itself became gridlocked as there were many 
disputes between the members of parliament and the president.  The breaking point came in the 
1970‘s, when the president attempted to energize the economy while redistributing wealth to the 
poorer classes at the same time.  Because the right and the left had such different visions of their 
country, compromise was impossible (Garretón, 2001 and Puryear, 1994).  Hence, in 1973 the 
military took over the government. 
For the remainder of the 1970‘s, the military-controlled government detained, tortured, 
and killed thousands of people. The military got rid of individual freedoms and dissolved 
parliament.  Because of the oppression, thousands of Chileans fled the country.  Unlike Haiti, 
however, there was a unified opposition to the government (Garretón 1989).  It seems as though 
people had never forgotten that at one point they were a republic.  The government took notice to 
this idea, and began to loosen its hard grip on the country. 
Starting in the 1980‘s, the government gradually transformed back into a democracy.  
People again had the right to freely express themselves and to elect their leaders.  The military 
improved their educational system so that their own citizens rather than the foreigners can 
contribute to the economy (Puryear, 1994).  The military also reversed many of the social 
reforms that were done earlier in the decade as an attempt to stabilize the Chilean economy 
(Garretón, 2001).  As a result, the middle class was able to grow again, and poverty decreased.  
Today Chile is a successful republic.  Their people are able to freely participate in political 
discourse while at the same time enjoying a high standard of living.  Haiti has a lot to learn from 
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Chile when it comes to improving their society so that everyone-from the working class to the 
elite-can benefit. 
Despite this period of political instability, Chile was able to move forward economically 
and socially, making sure that their citizens were treated fairly.  For instance, in the early 1970‘s, 
the Chilean economy was struck by a depression, inflation, and workers‘ strikes.  In 1973, the 
Chilean government was overthrown by a military coup that later would be known for 
committing human rights violations, torture, and even murders.  In the 1980‘s, Chile had 
recovered economically, and the government gradually began to grant its people more freedom 
(Schneider, 2007).  Chile‘s GDP in 2009 was 242.2 billion US dollars and 14,600 per capita.  
The GDP of Chile increased with an annual average near 4 percent since 1999 (CIA, 2010).  The 
damage from 2010 earthquake impacted about 11% of Chile 2009 gross domestic product.  This 
number will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.  In contrast with Haiti, Chile has a 
reputation of being the strongest and most stable economy in South America.  During the early 
1990s, Chile‘s reputation made it an international role model for economic stability and growth.  
It was also during this time period that Chile‘s seismic design code was adopted, indicating that 
Chile‘s strong economic status helped give it the opportunity to develop and improve other 
aspects of its society.  In 1996, NCh433 was adopted and included a similar analysis procedure 
to that appearing in the 1997 UBC.  As a result, when strong earthquakes struck the country the 
buildings were overall well-designed and up to code so there was a minimal loss of life.   
3.3 Buildings and Code Considerations  
3.3.1 Buildings: 
There is a variation of building types found in Chile: reinforced concrete, timber-frames, 
confined masonry, reinforced, and unreinforced masonry.  Generally, confined masonry 
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structures performed well during an earthquake.  For clarification purposes, confined masonry is 
built by constructing the masonry panel first, and then a concrete frame is cast around the 
masonry.  As the concrete cures and shrinks slightly, the masonry is compressed, behaving like a 
post-tensioned structure.  Poorly reinforced masonry and timber frame homes generally 
performed poorly under the seismic loading.  In contrast, reinforced concrete and confined 
masonry structures generally performed well.  Typical damage to these structures included 
diagonal cracking or wall failure due to lack of boundary elements or vertical displacement in 
buildings with stacked openings (Leon, 2010).  Unreinforced masonry structures experienced the 
most catastrophic failure: collapse of portions of the building.  This type of construction includes 
churches, older structures, walls in homes, and fences (Tanner, 2010).  
Not only is the structure of buildings vulnerable to the effects of an earthquake, but the 
building‘s nonstructural components are also prone to damage.  This type of damage greatly 
affects hospitals, airports, utilities, and services.  Even though the building‘s structure may not be 
damaged by an earthquake, the nonstructural components such as suspended ceilings, 
mechanical and electrical equipment, and plumbing might be so significantly damaged that the 
building is left inoperable.  In some cases flooding or water damage occurred when pipes burst 
underground or in buildings.  Many buildings, even if they suffered no damage, experienced loss 
of power, water, or communications services that hindered the recovery of the community after 
the earthquake (Miranda, 2010). 
3.3.2 Code’s enforcement 
Unlike Haiti, Chile has a nationalized building code and it is enforced rigorously by the 
government.  The seismic structural code of Chile, NCh433 (1996), has many provisions based 
on ACI 318-95and ASCE7-05.  It does not, however, limit vertical irregularities in calculating 
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the seismic response coefficient C (Moehle, 2010), as compared to the limitation of seismic shear 
force calculation that referenced ASCE7-05.  Nor does NCh433 require the provisions of ACI 
that address boundary elements in walls.  Because of this, what was found in many walls that 
failed were concentrations of vertical bars at both ends, and widely spaced bars in the middle, as 
shown in Figure 3-5 below (Leon, 2010).  With tensile strength of the wall concentrated at the 
ends, the steel could not reach yield, and brittle crushing of concrete occurred as seen in the 
following picture.  In contrast, ACI requires hooks or U-stirrups to resist buckling of vertical 
edge reinforcement (ACI 318, 1995).   
  
Figure 3-5.  Damage due to concentration of vertical steel bars at end of walls (Leon, 2010) 
NCh433 1996 Section 8 for secondary elements enforces the anchorage and tying of non 
structural components.  According to EERI‘s newsletter report (EERI, 2010b), the enforcement 
of this provision in Chile actually depended on the building owner.  One of the most noticeable 
examples after the earthquake is the closure of the international airports in Santiago and 
Conceptión, which are major air transportations in Chile (Miranda, 2010).  About 60% of the 130 
hospitals were temporarily taken out of commission by nonstructural failures, which caused a 
substantial dollar loss to the economy and put patients‘ lives at risk (Meade et al., 2010)  
There is certainly no building that can be designed to be completely earthquake-proof.  
The cost of constructing such a structure would be too expensive.  The earthquake that happened 
in Chile in February 2010 showed that Chile‘s design code and enforcement were able to protect 
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many lives and minimize structural damage.  Although many buildings were damaged beyond 
repair, lives were saved by preventing total collapse.  The results of this earthquake served both 
as a lesson and as a reminder for Chile in its approach to seismic codes.  The building code they 
enacted and enforced saved many people‘s lives because buildings do not collapse.  However, 
the consequences of damage to nonstructural elements were also demonstrated, and in some 
buildings this was the only form of damage (Miranda, 2010).  The lesson for Chile is that even 
though they have a building code in place, the code itself needs to be updated because of 
unforeseen damage seen in the earthquake—in this case, to the nonstructural components of the 
building. 
3.4 Summary: 
So far, the paper discusses the differences between the earthquake effects in Haiti and Chile.  
Powerful earthquakes occur more frequently in Chile than in Haiti.  Because Chile is a 
developed, stable country, it was able to enforce a modern, strict building code.  Although the 
dollar amount of damage in Chile was large, the code minimized the loss of lives, and the 
economic loss was a much smaller fraction of the GDP of the country.  The difference in the 
construction methods and the building types in Haiti and Chile had a tremendous impact in the 
aftermath of the earthquakes.  Because there is a standardized building code in Chile, fewer 
people died than in Haiti.  The irony of the building code, however, is that the repair costs of a 
modern building are much higher than in a building typically found throughout the developing 
world.  Because of what happened to Haiti in January, it is critical to have a building code in 
place because human lives cannot be replaced.  One challenge facing Haiti if it were to enact a 
seismic building code, however, is the affordability in relation to the tradeoffs of other needs of 
society.   
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Chapter 4  
 New Zealand-An application of a modern building code  
Chile‘s experience has been presented as an example of connecting the gap between Haiti—a 
community whose ability to reduce disaster vulnerability or loss is limited—and New Zealand—
a country that has sufficient resources and stability to develop and implement procedures to resist 
disaster vulnerability.  New Zealand‘s experience is presented here as an example of natural 
hazard resistance with an application of modern building code.  In this section, the topics to 
cover include factors such as New Zealand‘s application and monitoring of building codes, 
organizational capacity of the local governments, and response of the country during catastrophic 
disaster.  The purpose of studying New Zealand is to help determine what should be the long 
term decisions in addressing the development of hazard mitigation directive in Haiti in the 
future. 
Introduction 
Six months later in the same year as the Haiti and Chile earthquakes, a major earthquake struck 
Christchurch, New Zealand.  Despite the magnitude of the quake being larger than those 
experienced by both Haiti and Chile, the damages were considerably less than from the events in 
both those countries.  What factors helped New Zealand be better prepared to resist earthquake 
damage?  As mentioned in the previous two parts, social and political history played important 
roles in community vulnerability; do they also play similar roles in New Zealand?  If not, what 
will be the main factor which can help resistance capacity and resilience capacity of a society?  
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These questions will be answered as a point of studying a developed country with hope to 
emphasize lessons for both Haiti and Chile to learn.   
4.1 The Earthquake 2010 
4.1.1 History of event 
At 16:35:45UTC (4:36 am September 4 local time) on September 3, 2010 an earthquake with 
magnitude of Mw= 7.1 struck South Island, New Zealand.  The rupture was a result of strike-slip 
faulting within the crust of the Pacific Plate, near the eastern foothill of the Southern Alps at the 
western edge of the Canterbury Plains (USGS, 2010d).  The epicenter was around 37 kilometers 
west of Christchurch, near the town of Darfield.  Because of this, its scientific name is the 
Darfield earthquake, though it is more widely known as the Canterbury earthquake. It was 
relatively shallow earthquake – about 10 kilometers below the surface of the Canterbury Plains –
and produced the strongest shaking ever recorded in New Zealand.  Ground near the epicenter 
experienced horizontal acceleration up to 1.25 times the acceleration due to gravity.  The 
earthquake was accompanied by a large surface rupture. 
It is important to note that there were nineteen earthquakes of a magnitude of 5.8 or 
higher that struck the country in the 20
th
 century and in the first part of the decade.  The deadliest 
of these earthquakes happened on February 3, 1931.  On that day, there were 256 casualties and 
thousands of injuries when a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck the Hawke‘s Bay region of New 
Zealand.  Although the earthquake that struck New Zealand in September 2010 was the most 
damaging earthquake that hit the country since the earthquake in 1931, there were no deaths 
(GeoNet, 2010). 
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4.1.2 Seismology aspects 
4.1.2.1 Geography and tectonic plates 
New Zealand is located about 1,250 mi (2,012 km) southeast of Australia, comprised of two 
main islands and numerous smaller scattered islands.  The islands are so widely spread that their 
weather ranges from the tropical to the Antarctic.  New Zealand's two main components are the 
North Island and the South Island, separated by Cook Strait. The North Island contains 44,281 sq 
mi (115,777 sq km) and South Island contains 58,093 sq mi (151,215 sq km).  Christchurch is 
the largest city in South Island, and the principal city of the Canterbury region.  It has a 
population of 376,700 as of June 2010 (CIA, 2010).  Christchurch city itself is generally flat.  It 
lies on the coastal periphery of a wide alluvial plain (Christchurch City, 2010).  
 
Figure 4-1.a.  Fault zone in New Zealand. 1b. Greendale fault 1c. Road offset due to fault 
(Jongens et al., and Begg, 2010) 
The earthquake that struck this part of New Zealand was classified as a result of a strike-
slip fault.  This type of fault is a strike-slip focal mechanism with a right lateral focal plane 
striking east-west.  A fault rupture occurred along a previously unknown fault line, which has 
been named the Greendale Fault.  Greendale Fault is a fault that has not ruptured in the last 
16,000 years.  Movement along the fault broke the surface, creating a fault trace that extends for 
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30 kilometers west from Rolleston, one of Christchurch‘s provinces.  As seen in Figure 4-1b and 
4-1c above, roads, fences, shelter belts and irrigation channels were offset sideways, in places up 
to 5 meters, with up to 1.3 meters vertical offset.  The area to the north of the fault rupture 
moved eastward and the area to the south moved westward (GNS Science, 2010). 
Within two weeks after the earthquake, there were more than 550 aftershocks with 
magnitude Mw greater than 3 (EERI, 2010c).  Some aftershocks were strong enough to cause 
damage to already-weakened structures.  The aftershocks were mainly clustered along the 
Greendale Fault.  As some of the aftershocks at the eastern end of the Greendale Fault were close 
to Christchurch, they were felt particularly strongly. 
4.1.3 Seismicity 
New Zealand straddles the boundary of the Australian and Pacific plates.  Relative plate motion 
of these two plates is obliquely convergent across the plate boundary at about 50 mm/yr in the 
north of the country, 40 mm/yr in the center, and 30 mm/yr in the south (DeMets et al., 1994).  
The complex faulting associated with the changing orientation of the subduction zones in the 
Northeast and Southwest (Figure 4-1a).  The fault changes from subduction zone at the edge of 
the Hikurangi plate to strike- slip orientation within the central volcanic region and Marlborough 
fault zone (Figure 4-1a).  As a result of this combination, New Zealand is a region of distributed 
seismicity.  The relative movements of the Australian and Pacific plates are not accommodated 
by one or two faults in a narrow zone, but in many faults across a wide zone.  That is the reason 
New Zealand has suffered from many large earthquakes, occurring in almost every region of the 
country (GNS Science, 2010). 
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4.1.4 Strength of earthquake 
Using Kramer‘s equation again for the moment magnitude of 7.1, the strength of the earthquake 
was computed and equaled to 4.66 x 10
26
 dyne cm, which is equivalent to about two third of a 
million tons of the chemical explosive Trinitrotoluene (TNT) (USGS calculation tool, 2010). 
4.1.5 Population affected 
New Zealand‘s population as of July, 2010 was 4,252,277 (CIA, 2010).  The population of 
Christchurch, the directly affected area by the earthquake itself, was 364,000.  There were only 
two people seriously injured by the earthquake (USGS, 2010d).  The percentage of affected 
population injured from the earthquake is considerably smaller than in Haiti and Chile.  The New 
Zealand earthquake happened at ground surface, therefore there was no effect of tsunami.  
However, the damage from liquefaction was severe and will be covered in the next section.  
From selected exposed cities in Figure 4-2b below, the affected population in Christchurch itself 
was up to 95% of the population in the three areas experiencing the largest Modified Mercalli 
intensity. 
 
Figure 4-2.a.  Intensity map.         2b. Population affected (USGS, 2010). 
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4.1.6 Damage estimation 
Estimated damaged during the earthquake was 3 billion US dollars (Withers et al., 2010).  To 
stay consistent to what has been done throughout the paper; it is found that the estimated dollar 
amount of the damage in New Zealand is 1.3% of its 2009 GDP.  However, the majority of the 
damaged structures in New Zealand were considered historical buildings or resident houses in 
historical areas, and the damage was principally caused by non-structural components.  The 
damaged structures and infrastructure were mostly within the city of Christchurch (GNS Science, 
2010).  In this, the country‘s second-largest city, the earthquake destroyed about 500 buildings 
and caused an estimated 930 million New Zealand dollars of damage (Withers et al., 2010).  The 
remaining majority of land damage occurring in 400 farms in Canterbury plain was caused by 
ground liquefaction.  The liquefaction resulted in major ground settlement (more than 300 mm in 
places), lateral spreading, and foundation support failure, with consequential building damage.   
4.2 Social, Economic and Political History  
New Zealand was a British colony until 1945.  Initially, New Zealand was governed by the 
British.  Slowly, New Zealand transformed into a self-governing country.  Unlike the United 
States, New Zealand never declared independence from Britain.  In fact, New Zealand remains a 
member of the Commonwealth Realm.  Even though the country is self-governing, they still 
regard Britain as a social and cultural model, and the Queen of England as their queen: the 
―Queen of New Zealand.‖   
Today, New Zealand is classified as a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy.  In this type of system, the people elect members of parliament and the prime 
minister.  Unlike the United States, the legislative and executive branches in New Zealand are 
intertwined.  This means that the prime minister works with parliament to pass legislations.  The 
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British monarchy remains the official head of state, but his or her powers are limited by the 
country‘s constitution (Chapman et al., 1999). 
New Zealand is a country with a population of about four million people.  Three-quarters 
of the population are European, and the rest of the country is comprised of immigrants from 
other Pacific islands and Asia, as well as the natives, called the Māori.  Like their European 
counterparts, New Zealand‘s population growth was due to an influx of immigrants moving into 
the country (Wilson, 2009).  Also, New Zealand‘s population is aging since fewer people are 
having children.  For the most part, the different groups of people manage to coexist.  Overall, 
New Zealand is a very stable country. 
New Zealand enjoys a high standard of living.  The country boasts a high number of 
educated people.  However, New Zealand is not immune to economical problems.  Unlike Chile, 
these problems did not destabilize New Zealand‘s government.  But from 1950 to the early 
twenty-first century, the country has experienced the unsteadiness of its economy.  One of the 
noticeable periods of economical instability was the collapse of the Korean War commodity 
boom, in the early of 1950s, which marked an unfortunate turning point in New Zealand‘s 
economic history (Singleton, 2010).  Despite this uncertain period of time, the New Zealand 
government had always looked for economic partners to ensure the stability of the country.  
Along with reforms within the government, New Zealand recovered from their economic 
troubles in the 1980‘s (Easton, 1994).  Rather than having government control each aspect of the 
economy, the government decided to stand aside and let the private sector contribute to the 
economy.  This model is similar to the American economy.  The economy of New Zealand 
began recovery toward the end of 1991.  With a brief break in 1998 due to the Asian financial 
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crisis, strong growth persisted for the remainder of the decade.  By the early 2000s, New 
Zealand‘s GDP per capita was in the bottom half of the developed world (CIA, 2010) 
4.3 Building Code and Enforcement  
New Zealand benefited from a modern structural code and rigorous enforcement.  In term 
of risk management, New Zealand has controlled their infrastructural and lifeline vulnerability to 
natural hazard with regional planning, improvements in local government and utilities 
preparedness since 1995 (EERI, 2010c).  Even with a modern building code, New Zealand was 
not immune to the damages caused by the earthquake that struck the country in 2010.  As 
mentioned above, the majority of buildings damaged at Christchurch were unreinforced 
masonry.  This damage occurred despite a 1968 nationwide ordinance in which Christchurch 
implemented regulations that required owners of unreinforced masonry buildings to upgrade 
their building to at least 33% of the capacity required by the code if there was a change of use of 
the building.  That is why some unreinforced masonry buildings in Christchurch had been 
upgraded (ASCE, 2010).  Additionally, at Christchurch, there was significant damage done on 
the nonstructural components and contents that left many buildings inoperable—negatively 
affecting the country‘s economy (EERI, 2010c).   
New Zealand, unlike Chile and the United States, enacted a ―performance-based code‖ in 
their country rather than a specification-based building code.  A Performance-based code is a 
guide on how a building and its components must perform to achieve the criteria.  The difference 
between this and the traditional specification-based building code is that the traditional code 
would list the requirements an engineer must meet in order to comply with the code, while the 
performance code sets out objectives to complete.  A performance-based code is not a particular 
recipe, but an idea—many recipes that are put together over a period of time.  This code simply 
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lists the goals of the building (i.e., the building ought to remain standing after an earthquake).  
Unlike a formal recipe, this code does not specify how to achieve the goal.  This idea evokes the 
creativity of the designer, for he or she is not restricted by the lengthy list of ingredients to come 
up with a unite design for a particular building.  A performance-based code is not more 
dangerous than a formal code.  Rather, a performance-based code is a different way of thinking 
about risk and a society‘s vulnerabilities to natural hazards.  Rather than thinking about risk 
management in the form of assumptions and equations, in performance-based engineering, 
objectives are set and it does not matter how one achieves the objectives of the design; the 
important thing is to achieve the goals put forth by the code.  The building code in New Zealand 
was developed over a long period.  In order to enact the code, engineers observed the aftermath 
of communities after many past earthquakes, and then observations were made in order to form a 
guide for future engineers to use.  The New Zealand Code is divided into clauses, and each 
clause begins with an objective that states clearly what the goal is.  Specific performance criteria 
for each clause then describe the extent to which the building must meet those objectives. 
4.4 An aftershock Mw 6.3 in February 2011 
Impact of natural hazard events is comprised of magnitude and frequency (Pelling, 2003).  The 
earthquake on February 22
th
, 2011 in New Zealand is an example of this concept.  The frequency 
of the earthquake impacted significantly and caused much more damage compared to the 
earthquake that happened on September, 2010.  The intensity of shaking in the 2011 earthquake 
was stronger and caused a death toll of 160 and 80 still missing (BBC News, 2011).  The 
magnitude aspect has been covered throughout the paper, while the frequency aspect is most 
significant in this example.  The February 2011 earthquake was measured as a magnitude Mw6.3 
which struck Christchurch again at 12:51 pm local time (2011-02-21 Coordinated Universal 
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Time).  The epicenter was located approximately 10 km south-east of Christchurch, near 
Diamond Harbour, Lyttelton with a considered shallow depth of less than 5 km.  The 
shallowness character, closeness of rupture to urban center and the timing of the occurrence had 
meant that the quake was particularly devastating (EERI, 2011d).  The estimate for this damage 
during the quake is roughly 8-10% of the entire country gross domestic product in 2010 (USGS, 
2011e).  The largest vulnerability building types subjected in this damage are reinforced masonry 
and concrete block masonry constructions (USGS, 2011e) 
 As mentioned previously, the aftershock happened with closer rupture distance and 
relatively large magnitude, these two factors are significantly important.  It is important to recall 
here an attenuation relationship, which is a function that is used to estimate different measures of 
ground motion intensity as a function of magnitude and distance.  There are two factors 
significantly involved in the attenuation as seen in the following equation: 
                             
                 
  
  
                              (Eq   4.4-1) 
 (Boore, Joyner, and Fumal, 1997) 
where: 
Y is the ground motion intensity (horizontal Peak Ground Acceleration or pseudo acceleration 
response Sa). 
M is the magnitude of the earthquake. 
b1, b2, b3, b5, bv are regression coefficients based on the fault types of rupture. 
vs is coefficient on the condition of soil/site condition (geological and geotechnical conditions). 
r is distance to source of rupture. 
vA is a constant. 
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In addition, the duration of ground motion is also essential.  The duration is the amount of 
time that the peak value occurrence takes place, or the number of times the peak value of 
acceleration occurs within the earthquake.  Clearly, these are the issues that the above attenuation 
does not account for.  While the attenuation considers a structure subjected to a single peak value 
of ground acceleration, it actually experienced many such accelerations.  
4.5 Summary: 
The 2010 earthquake in New Zealand was 1.25 times stronger as compared to the earthquake that 
happened in Haiti, but the damage in Haiti was much worse.  The challenge New Zealand faces 
at this time is how to maintain or even improve their code and enforcement to ensure their people 
will not be in danger during any natural hazards as well as to reduce the amount of damage 
caused.  Despite the damage from the recent aftershock, New Zealand stood out as a country 
with high hazard resistance (USGS, 2011e).  It is essential to mention that the country‘s 
resistance capacity reflects economic health and the system of maintenance within it.  This 
capacity helps the country to withstand the impact of natural hazards.  So New Zealand‘s path 
leading to improvement of an already successful maintenance program was not only to target 
disaster vulnerability, but also to focus on the wider goals of economic, social and political 
inclusion.  Yet, structural enforcement of such a building standard is as crucial as the mentioned 
path.  Has New Zealand achieved a reduced amount of damage, especially from unreinforced 
masonry and non-structural component failures?  The answer is: not yet.  Maybe the country 
needs to even further improve its building code targeting this aspect.  Because of this reason, an 
overview to see how a different country would deal with unreinforced masonry structures is 
significant.  In the following part, an overview of the unreinforced masonry act enacted in 
California will be presented. 
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4.6 A view of America in Un-reinforced masonry structures: the Unreinforced 
Masonry Building Law of 1986   
4.6.1 Introduction. 
The outcomes of three major earthquakes occurring in 2010 in the countries of Haiti, Chile, and 
New Zealand included catastrophic failure or damage of unreinforced masonry structures 
(URM).  This significant amount of damage created a motivation to know how a country with 
seismic code provisions would treat unreinforced masonry structures.  California is a state with 
certain regions that have extremely high seismicity.  In the following part of the paper, a review 
of the view and attitude toward URM buildings in areas of high seismic risk will be made.  
Studying California‘s URM Act does not imply that the Act should be the model role to look 
after.  It is actually to find out whether the Act itself has achieved positive results or not.  Thus, 
from the results one can quantify which action can be relevant to reduce damages from URM 
failure in the future. 
4.6.2 The Unreinforced Masonry Building Law of 1986  
Over the years, American seismic engineers have been seeking to provide the world the most 
proficient way of dealing with earthquake‘s damages.  Building codes and laws seek to protect 
lives, while trying to minimize damages caused by earthquakes.  Such codes are often developed 
in response to poor performance by structures during earthquakes.  For instance, from 1868 to 
1994, California suffered from major earthquakes such as Hayward (1868), Kern County (1952), 
Loma Prieta (1989), and others.  Unreinforced masonry (URM) structures appeared to be greatly 
affected by earthquakes, generally performing poorly.  This poor performance in the 1933 Long 
Beach earthquake drove a change in California building codes, no longer allowing URM 
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buildings to be constructed (Hess, 2008).  However, many URM structures in Seismic Zone 4 
regions remained, and in 1986, a law was passed to address the public safety risk posed by these 
structures.  This law, Senate Bill 547, became known as the unreinforced masonry (URM) law 
(EERI, 2004) 
To help understand the motivation for the URM law in the state, it is important to 
remember why URM is considered a dangerous material for structures in seismically active 
areas.  Masonry is constructed from units, historically brick or stone, bound together by mortar.  
Masonry materials are brittle, and can support very little tensile loads, if any.  Like concrete, 
masonry structures depend on reinforcing, usually in the form of steel bars, to carry these forces.  
The ground motions caused by strong earthquakes can be enough to produce cracks, significant 
deformations, separations, cause units or even sections of walls to disconnect and fall, and even 
total collapse (Hess, 2008). 
The URM law creates a program that aims to increase public safety and decrease the 
damage caused to URM structures during earthquakes (Hess, 2008).  The law requires each local 
government within Seismic Zone 4 to: 
a) Identify all potentially hazardous buildings in their jurisdiction by 1990. 
b) Establish a mitigation program for hazardous buildings. 
c) Report all information from (b) and (c) to the Seismic Safety Commission (SSC). 
(Calf. Government Code, 2009; FEMA, 1999) 
The SSC recommends that mitigation programs include retrofits such as removal or 
bracing of parapets, anchoring URM walls to roof and floor framing, bracing walls that do not 
meet height to thickness requirements for stability, developing horizontal diaphragms to control 
relative displacement, and developing in plane strength of walls to control inter-story 
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displacements.  Even though experience has shown that retrofitting URM buildings reduces both 
damage and loss of life, some local governments have adopted voluntary or ―notification only‖ 
programs (Hess, 2008). 
There were four types of URM programs in 1986, which were categorized as: Mandatory 
Strengthening, Voluntary Strengthening, Notification Only, and Other.  Mandatory 
Strengthening requires strengthening in the building based on the City of Los Angeles Division 
88 ordinance.  The ordinance requires retrofitting and improvement of buildings with URM 
bearing walls.  This program is described by the SSC as the most effective program type.  
Voluntary Strengthening requires owners to evaluate the risk in their building.  The owner 
describes to their local governments the risk of their building and the time when they intend to 
retrofit.  Notification Only involves the building owners receiving notification from the local 
government stating that their buildings belong to the building types known to exhibit poor 
performance in earthquakes.  This program is described by the SSC as the least effective 
program type.  Other similar requirements could be made by the cities or local governments.  
Examples ranged from requiring owners to post on the URM building a warning card to inform 
occupants and passersby of the earthquake threat, to various levels of strengthening (CSSC, 
2003). 
The California Seismic Safety Commission made recommendations to the State 
Legislature in 2006 based on the results of information reported to the SSC in item (c) of the 
URM law.  Its recommendations included strengthening of all URM buildings, incentives to 
encourage building owners to retrofit, adoption of the International Existing Building Code as 
the State‘s model building code, and establishing retrofit standards and programs for other 
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building types that are also vulnerable to collapse during earthquakes such as soft-story, tilt-up, 
and older concrete structures (CSSC, 2003). 
Although demolition exists as an option for jurisdictions with hazardous buildings, this 
method is rarely used, if only as a last resort, with most choosing to work with owners to retrofit 
rather than tear their buildings down.  Because retrofitting measures are often expensive, it may 
seem that demolition would be a more efficient option; however, since the option is usually left 
to building owners, this is rarely done.  Additionally, nearly all URM buildings in these 
communities were built before 1933, located in historic districts, and often considered historic 
themselves (EERI, 2004).  The disruption caused in a historic area by demolishing a building 
may be undesirable to the community.  Further, if the building itself is historic; it is more 
desirable to the community to keep the building by retrofitting rather than losing it by 
demolition. 
The URM law has not generally received strong opposition, in part because the law give 
the authority to individual communities to decide what programs will be used an how they will 
be enforced.  Those which chose mandatory retrofit initially received opposition from some 
building owners, due to costs of strengthening and additional taxes on the increased value of the 
building.  This opposition ended, however, when the 1994 Northridge earthquake demonstrated 
the benefits of upgrading the hazardous buildings (Hess, 2003). 
Some people feel that the URM law does not go far enough to protect public safety 
because it allows local governments to choose their own mitigation program and does not require 
retrofit except under the ―Mandatory Strengthening‖ program, if chosen by the jurisdiction.  
Some jurisdictions are still operating under a ―Notification Only‖ program, which requires only a 
posted warning describing the danger of an URM structure during the earthquake, and posting 
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this warning is the responsibility of the building owner.  Additionally, cosmetic coverings that 
change building appearance and lack of enforcement have allowed non-compliance with this 
type of program (CSSC, 2004; Grossi and Muir-Wood, 2006). 
Despite the lack of enforcement by some communities, general compliance with the law 
as a whole is very high, with less than 1% not yet completing URM inventories and about 98% 
of URM structures in mitigation programs (CSSC, 2003).  The data from the SSC show a high 
level of compliance with the URM law, and important work has been done to establish URM 
building inventories and retrofit in the jurisdictions that have chosen such a program.  Without 
requiring retrofit in all the affected communities, however, adequate steps have not been taken to 
ensure each URM building is safe during an earthquake.  In order for people to describe the 
URM law as successful, the law should incorporate the SSC recommendations of requiring 
mandatory retrofit programs, and adoption of the International Existing Building Code, so that 
upgrades are made in compliance with the latest standards.  
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Chapter 5  
Case study of the Former US Embassy 
 Chancery Building Office, Port- au- Prince, Haiti 
Introduction  
Although many buildings failed after the earthquake in 2010, Haiti, the Chancery Office 
Building, U.S Embassy in Port-au-Prince stood out with only minor damage (DesRoches, 2010).  
This building received strengthening after J.R Harris & Company prepared a seismic Evaluation 
Report in 1995.  To understand and possibly provide the view of past evaluation, a model for this 
building was built in computer structural software called MIDAS.  A comparison between the 
seismic evaluation of the structure in 1995 and the evaluation model was made.  
The case study includes an analysis and design of a two story concrete moment resisting 
frame building located in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  The illustration of the structural part includes 
applications of ASCE 7-05 design provisions and ACI318-05.  The design process began with 
the determination of the loads and appropriate load combinations. Then, the period of the 
building was checked after applying those loads to the MIDAS model.  Then the beam and 
column members were selected in accordance with the strong column weak beam philosophy.  
For these selections, the seismic check included the story drifts, and the stability coefficients 
were needed to verify that the selections made were valid.  
5.1 Background of the structure’s seismic evaluation in 1995  
Written by J.R Harris & Company, Structural Engineering, the report presented an evaluation of 
the structure against criteria for seismic performance following the NEHRP Handbook for 
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Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (FEMA 178), and designed upgrades to meet the 
requirement of Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic Regulations for New 
Buildings (FEMA 222), 1991 edition as well as modify the existing structural elements to meet 
the criteria in FEMA 178.  The Chancery building is a two story reinforced concrete special 
resisting frame with stone masonry infills, and stiffened steel panels were added as a result of 
Harris‘ strengthening plan.  Partitions consist of concrete and concrete block walls.  The building 
is reported to have been constructed on land reclaimed from the bay and is supported on concrete 
(and some wood) friction piles that are 30 to 40 feet long. The ground floor is a reinforced 
concrete structural slab-on-grade.  The 2
nd
 floor and roof slabs consist of reinforced concrete 
joists and beams with concrete block fillers.  The span lengths of the structural concrete members 
are listed in Table 5-1. 
Member type Direction Length 
Joists North-south 5120 mm (16.8 ft) 
Beams East-west 8960 mm (29.4 ft) 
Table 5-1.  Structural members spans 
The roof plan showing the member spans is illustrated in Figure 5-1.  The plan form is 
rectangular with two interior courtyards. Most interior partitions are concrete masonry with 
plaster (Table 5-2).  The exterior cladding at the second story is an infilled panel of glass and 
light gage steel sheets built on a frame of small steel tubes.  Three types of cladding are used at 
the first story: the original panels similar to the second story exist at the interior courtyards, and 
some bays are infilled with a thick panel of random field stone.  The original panels on the 
remainder of the exterior have been replaced with steel and glass panels of structural grade plate 
and heavy tubes combined with security glass. 
53 
 
 
Figure 5-1.  Roof plan view. 
Wall 
Location 
Type 
Exterior Double wythe stone (335 mm thick), stiffened steel panel (2 layers of ¼‖ steel 
plate on frames of 6‖×4‖ and 4‖×4‖ steel tubes), and window/wall façade. 
Interior 
partitions 
100 mm concrete block with some reinforcement and 100 mm unreinforced 
concrete at upper levels. 
Table 5-2.  Wall location 
 
5.2 Material properties 
5.2.1 Concrete 
f‘c 3000 psi = 20.6 MPa 
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E 21.5 GPa 
ν 0.3 
w 22.8 kN/m
3
 
m 2300 kg/m
3
 
Table 5-3.  Concrete properties 
5.2.2 Steel 
fy 275 MPa 
E 200 GPa 
ν 0.3 
Table 5-4.  Steel Properties 
5.2.3 Stone Infill 
E 20.7 GPa 
ν 0.25 
w 25.1 kN/m
3
 
m 2562 kg/m
3
 
Table 5-5.  Stone Infill properties 
5.2.4 Infill Masonry  
E 10.3 GPa 
ν 0.25 
w 17.0 kN/m
3
 
m 1730 kg/m
3
 
Table 5-6.  Infill Masonry properties 
5.3 Loads 
Self weight values of building materials are given in tables below: 
5.3.1 Second Floor 
Partitions 40.0 psf 
¾‖ Terrazo 9.4 psf 
2 ½‖ Slab 31.3 psf 
12‖×4‖ Joists @ 20‖ o.c. 30.0 psf 
Form Blocks 21.8 psf 
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1‖ Plaster Ceiling 12.5 psf 
Arch., Mech., Misc. 5.0 psf 
Total Dead Load 150 psf 
Live Load 25 psf 
Table 5-7.  Self-weight of building materials in second floor 
5.3.2 Roof 
Roofing 21.0 psf 
2 ½‖ Slab 31.3 psf 
10‖ ×4‖ Joists @ 20‖ o.c. 24.6 psf 
Form Blocks 20.0 psf 
1‖ Plaster Ceiling 12.5 psf 
Arch., Mech., Misc. 5.0 psf 
Large Mechanical Units 5.0 psf 
Total Dead Load 119.4 psf 
Live Load 10 psf 
Table 5-8.  Self-weight of building materials in roof 
5.4 Description and commentary of evaluation and design  
The original analysis by Harris in 1995 was performed using FEMA-178, NEHRP Handbook for 
the Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings.  Where seismic retrofit was necessary, criteria 
given in FEMA-222, NEHRP Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic 
Regulations for New Buildings was used.  Analysis in MIDAS was performed using ACI 318-89 
which chosen to be suitable according to the period of construction.  Reinforcement design was 
performed using ACI 318-89 in the original analysis by Harris. Checking in Midas for design 
also used ACI 318-89.  From Harris‘s evaluation, the building was built based on a smaller 
response spectrum of ground acceleration (see Figure 5-2), while after the 2010 earthquake, 
USGS reported a larger response spectrum (see Figure 5-3).  Strengthening design is therefore 
needed to satisfy the new spectrum analysis.  This strengthening design analysis uses ACI 318-
05. 
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5.4.1 Design response spectrum 
The design response spectrum was then obtained from the Harris‘s evaluation, shown below. 
 
Figure 5-2. Harris's evaluation design response spectrum curve. 
In order to find the seismic design catefory of the site, a spectrum analysis is done on the USGS 
program (found at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/hazmaps/design/index.php).  The curve is 
shown in Figure 5-3 below.   
 
Figure 5-3.  Design response spectrum using USGS (2010) spectral data. 
 Clearly, the two design spectrum curves are quite different.  It is interesting to recall that 
the structure was reportedly only subjected to minor damage despite the difference between the 
design earthquake and the one that actually occurred.   
5.4.2 Seismic coefficients 
Based on Table 12.2-1 in ASCE 7-05, the response modification coefficient R was found to be 8. 
In addition, the occupancy category of the building is‗I‘, with an importance factor of one, from 
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Section 11.5.2 in ASCE 7-05.  The seismic design category was found to be category D based on 
the SDS and SD1 values from Table 5-9 and Section 11.6 of ASCE 7-05.  
 
Table 5-9.  Seismic mapping coefficients 
5.4.3 Loads and Load Combinations: 
The next step in the design process was to determine the appropriate load combinations to be 
used for the building.  There are two load combinations that include seismic loading: 
 (1.2+0.2SDS)D+ρQE+L+0.2S   (controlling equation)                   (Eq 5.4.3-1) 
 (0.9-0.2SDS)D+ρQE+1.6H                                                              (Eq 5.4.3-2) 
Load Combinations are based on strength design (LRFD) from section 12.4.2 in ASCE 7-05. 
Both load combinations include a redundancy factor ρ for the seismic load QE.  In this building, 
ρ is equal to 1.3 (from ASCE 7-05 section 12.3.4.2 for seismic catergory D).  Combination (Eq 
5.4.3-1) was found to be the controlling load combination and it was used in the design 
calcualtions as well as in the MIDAS model.  Load patterns including seismic and self-weight 
loads are presented in Appendix 4. 
5.4.4 Period Check 
The buidling model in MIDAS was built, and then the period from this model was obtained.  
Seismic coefficients were input into the model as well as the ground motion coefficient from the 
Location and mapping coefficients: Units Reference
Ss 1.069 g USGS,2010
S1(s) 0.68 g USGS,2010
Site class D ASCE11.4-1 USGS,2010
Fa 1 g ASCE11.4-1
Fv 1.5 g ASCE11.4-1
SMS=FaSs 1.069 g ASCE11.4-1
SM1=FvS1 1.02 g ASCE11.4-2
SDS=2/3SMS 0.713 g ASCE11.4-3
SD1=2/3SM1 0.68 g ASCE11.4-4
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earthquake. The approximate period according to the code was computed as Ta=0.251seconds. 
This period value was used for the equilvalent lateral force (ELF) method together with the 
seismic coefficient to find the seismic force distribution in each floor.  The period found in the 
MIDAS model was 0.49 seconds for the fundamental mode (see Table 5-10).  The fact that Ta 
was used even though it is less than the period from the model was because the intention was to 
conservatively design the building with lager forces. 
 
Table 5-10.  Approximate periods 
5.4.5 Base Shear and Story Forces  
The next step was to determine the building shear forces to compare them with the output 
building shear forces from the MIDAS model. In order to determine the shear forces at each 
floor, the equivalent lateral force procedure was used based on section 12.8 of ASCE 7-05.  The 
period used in this process was 0.49 seconds and the k coefficient in the equations for the vertical 
distribution factor of story forces (Cvx) was taken as 1 according to ASCE7-05 equation 12.8-12. 
Using the designated period, the importance factor, the response modification coefficients, SDS, 
SD1, and S1, the seismic response coefficient was calculated based on section 12.8 of ASCE 7-05.  
Building Approximated Period Reference
hn(ft) 21.3 building h
Ct(CMRF) 0.016 ASCE12.8-2
x 0.9 ASCE12.8-3
Ta(s)=Ct*hn
x 0.251 min value
Ta(s)=CuTa 0.351 ASCE12.8-7
Tn((s)(from model) 0.49 MIDAS
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Calculations for this coefficient can be seen in Table 5-11 below. 
 
Table 5-11.  Base shear coefficients 
The base shear was determined to be 389 kips for the whole building.  As seen below, in 
table 5-12, the distribution of shear forces is also computed for each floor.  Accidental torsion 
also needed to be considered in the shear forces.  To account for this torsion, the shear force was 
increased by 5%.  For this building, since it is rectangular, the center of mass is in the same 
location as the center of rigidity.  This means that there are no torsional irregularities in this 
building therefore, torsion amplification is not necessary. Table 5-12 and 5-13 list the calculated 
story forces and the output of story forces from MIDAS.  As seen in Figure 5-4, the seismic 
forces acting at the rigidity center of the building:  
 
Table 5-12.  Base shear hand calculation 
 
Figure 5-4.  Distribution of story forces 
The story forces were then compared to hand calculations to ensure the accuracy of the 
model.  Shown in table 5-13 below the results of hand calculation for story force ( F) and the 
model story force ( Fmodel). 
Shear Force at each Floor
k= 1
Vs= 378 kips---> BASE SHEAR
Floor h(ft) W(kips) Wxhx
k Cvx
Roof 21.6 1141 24645 0.70
1st Floor 10.3 1037 10683 0.30
ASCE 12.812
Notes/References
Base Shear Force: Value Units
W-roof 1141 kips
W-floor 1037 kips
W-total 2178 kips
Vs,base 378 kips
beams carry selfweights
ASCE 12.8.1
Cs*W
Notes/References
beams carry selfweights
60 
 
 
Table 5-13.  Comparison of hand calculation and model forces. 
Since the two results are close to each other at this point, it is not necessary to further 
obtain all the calculations by hand.  At the time of  the evaluation, J R Harris Co had included the 
concrete walls as well as the steel panels in their analysis, and the impact of these wall added a 
significant rigidity to the building.  The fact that the building experienced only minor damage 
means it must have received some help from these walls.  Yet, when modeling this building, all 
the walls were taken out so that the analysis was solely focused on the frame structure itself.  
Consequently, as a result of this simplification, the displacement check for the frame did not 
meet the code requirement.  Although, it appears that the safety factor when the building was 
built had also helped the building as well, based on the fact that it was only subjected to minor 
damage.  Seen in Figure 5-5 below is one of the capacity checks of a beam member chosen at 
random. 
  
Figure 5-5. Random capacity check of a beam member 
5.4.6 Member Selection 
The model was run with the new response spectrum design requirement and with the focus solely 
on the frame.  Displayed below is the proposal for a new design which satisfied the new 
Floor F(kips) 1.05*F(kips) Fmodel(kips)%Difference
Roof 264 277 266 4.0
1st Floor 114 120 122 -1.7
BASE SHEAR 378 397 388 2.3
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spectrum, drift requirement, and strong column weak beam philosophy.  For the sake of 
completeness, these beams and columns were optimized to meet the code requirements.  For 
some columns, the strict newer code requirements for story drift required the section geometry to 
be changed.  Shown in the following table 5-14 are the newly designed members.  Optimized 
design is beyond the scope of this case study, therefore it should be the topic for further studies. 
 
Table 5-14.  Designed section geometry for all columns 
Shown in Appendix 6 and 7 are the reinforced design for beams and columns.  A 
challenge in the design is that the story drift was large after amplifying by Cd=5.5.  Because of 
this, the members selected are rather large in order to withstand the earthquake.  MIDAS has an 
option that checks the story drift for each trial of the selection, as seen in Figure 5-6 and Table 5-
15 below.  These parameters are matched with the code requirement of the allowable drift. 
Strong column-weak beam requirements are also checked in Appendix 8 prior to the selection. 
b(in) h(in)
22 22
21 21
21 21
22 22
22 22
21 21
21 21
22 22
22 22
22 22
Lower B1 and B8
Lower A1 to A8
Upper A1 to A9
Location
Cross section
Upper D1 to D8
Lower D1 to D8
Lower  A1 and A8
Upper D2 to D7
Upper B1 and B8
Upper A1 and A8
Upper D1 and D8
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Figure 5-6.  Displacements for story drift check 
The ratio of allowable story drift for Occupancy Category I for this type of structure is required 
to be less than 0.02 times the story height according to Table 12.12-1 in ASCE 7-05.  Table 5-15 
and Appendix 5 show that for both Floor 1 and the roof, this value is below 0.02. 
 
Table 5-15.  Story drift. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Through the use of the equivalent lateral force method, the shear forces at each floor were 
determined and compared to the results from using modal analysis.  These forces were then input 
into MIDAS, allowing for the member sizes to be determined.  Checks were made to ensure that 
the required strengths were met along with the seismic requirements from the code.  The checks 
resulted in the member sizes being increased significantly to make them seismically sufficient.  
Based on the calculations discussed in this part, the structural design of this two story CMRF 
building is properly designed to take into account the high seismic load found in Port-au-Prince, 
Haiti.  The building has been designed to resist the hierarchy of failure modes by sizing the 
Story ELF model MRSA modelratio(EFL) ratio(MRSA)
Roof 0.278 0.169 0.012 0.007
Floor 1 0.172 0.100 0.007 0.004
Story Drift(in)
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members appropriately to control the relative strength of members under these failure modes.  It 
is beyond the scope of this part to see if the building designed in this report is cost-effective. 
Although it had been previously strengthened before JR. Harris & Co‘s proposal, the 
former U.S. Embassy building was found to have a number of deficiencies according to the new 
code requirements.  The model created in Midas confirmed several of these weaknesses under 
seismic loading.  Calculated strength values of frame members matched well with those obtained 
by MIDAS.  The presence of infill walls provided a unique opportunity to study how the 
structure behaved with these elements, even though modeling their proper behavior is not well 
understood.  It is clear that modeling these walls using wall elements in the software helps the 
structure, although in this case, still not enough to resist the design loads of this study.  With this 
in mind, these walls are likely to crack under seismic loading, thus drastically reducing the 
amount of capacity they can contribute to the structure.  An alternative for strengthening these 
walls with FRP may be offered, in order to allow these walls to contribute to the capacity more 
reliably.  Overall, with the outcome of the results, understanding this recommendation was 
enhanced, although the reinforcing in stone wall and infill wall would also be interesting to 
consider. 
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Chapter 6  
Comparisons and Findings 
Different levels of risk that a community accepts depend on the type of economic, social, and 
political systems in place in the community, as well as their level of development.  These three 
factors greatly influenced the reaction of Haiti, Chile, and New Zealand after the earthquakes 
that struck their countries.  Understanding these unique differences between the accepted level of 
risk and the individual country requires engineers to analyze each country separately.  As shown 
in Figure 6-1, for a specific risk, a framework is made to detail the many factors that come along 
with the risk, and it is up to the individual country to decide the acceptable level of risk that they 
can endure. 
 
Figure 6-1.  Components of risk. (Pelling, 2008) 
In previous chapters, natural hazards, human vulnerability, and the exposure of the 
countries to natural hazards have been discussed.  In this chapter, the rest of the risk components 
will be covered, and the parts determining them categorized.  In contrast to exposure, which 
makes people susceptible to risk, the role of resistance and resilience capacity represents the 
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capacity of the community to withstand impacts of hazards.  As seen from Figure 6-1, these 
capacities come from the community‘s livelihood, health, adjustment, and preparation.  
Resilience capacity can only be enhanced if resistance within the society is high and exposure is 
lessened.  In other words, human vulnerability can only be less impacted by risk when its 
exposure is reduced and its resistance and resilience capacities are significantly reliable (Pelling, 
2010). 
After a review of the literature presented in the previous sections, the differences among 
Haiti, Chile, and New Zealand appears clear.  The differences indeed show a consequence 
between each country‘s economic, social, and political systems and its corresponding resilience 
capacity.  The resilience of a country after a disaster depends on the history of physical, 
economic, social and political performance which took place prior to the disturbance (Corotis, 
2010).  Haiti‘s community is an example of poor resilience capacity in this case.  Their economy, 
society, and government are very susceptible to the disruption caused by a natural hazard.  To be 
able to measure the risk Haiti has faced in the past and analyze potential risks in the future is one 
of the ways to determine the resilience ability within the country itself.  In this section of the 
paper, identification and analysis of the resilience capacity for the three countries--Haiti, Chile 
and New Zealand--will be made.  Even though the resilience capacity is different in the three 
countries, one can draw a reasonable conclusion about the lessons each country can learn from 
problems that arose by a disaster.  For Haiti, this will be to the driving-force to reconstruct the 
country or at least to identify who in the Haitian government would oversee the elimination of 
the factors that had pushed the country into the current situation.  For Chile, the challenge is 
what should be improved so that natural hazard can be mitigated without any harm to the 
community or even without damage to structures.  And lastly, for New Zealand, the country that 
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overcame the 2010 earthquake the most successfully, the question is how to maintain such a high 
level of resilience of its society and how to continue to bring the country forward in the manner it 
has experienced in the past year.   
This thesis has provided a picture of the susceptibilities of Haiti though looking at its 
social and political histories.  Chile and New Zealand have provided two examples of countries 
that were able to establish meaningful dialogue between the different parties involved in the 
society to reduce risks and plan for future events.  It is to Haiti‘s advantage to learn from Chile 
and New Zealand‘s history of code development, as to create its own meaningful way to 
establish dialogue between the different components of society and to mitigate the risk to 
disasters.  This part will summarize the objectives and analyze the available information to 
conclude the urgent sustainability requirements for Haiti.  In addition, there will be the general 
summary as well as the comments based on throughout comprised observations. 
6.1 Relationship between damage after natural hazards and gross domestic product  
The damage caused by the earthquakes in the three countries: Haiti, Chile, and New Zealand, is 
seen in Figure 6-2 below.  This figure shows the relationship between the damage after a natural 
hazard (in this case, an earthquake) and the country‘s gross domestic product.  This chart has 
used Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as a measurement of economic activity per 
person within a country, reflecting the country‘s economic dimension.  As the country‘s GDP 
increases, the cost of damage caused by the earthquake as a percentage of the GDP decreases 
dramatically.  Damage estimation after the natural disaster is used as a percentage of GDP for the 
whole country.  From this chart, one can easily see that the damage is reduced considerably when 
the economy of a country is vigorous.  Indeed, one of the factors that led to Haiti‘s struggle after 
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the earthquake was its weak economy.  This means in order to reduce the risk toward natural 
hazard, the GDP of Haiti in particular, needs to be increased.  A stronger economy would 
improve Haiti‘s capacity to devote resources to reduce the amount of damage experienced during 
natural disasters.  As demonstrated by New Zealand, a country with a growing economy can 
recover more quickly from damage, so the highest priority efforts to enhance resistance capacity 
against risk are to develop the economy.  Additionally, it is essential to adapt retrofitting 
specification as well as effective enforcement especially for historic (unreinforced masonry) 
buildings.  The earthquake in 2011 indeed dramatically exposed the vulnerability of these 
structures (USGS, 2011) and increases the damage overall, as seen in Figure 6-2 below. 
 
 
Figure 6-2.  Relationship between damage and GDP per capita 
The decay portion between Haiti and Chile seems exaggerated.  A question to ask is how 
this portion of the curve ought to look like if there are more data added to the chart.  Therefore, 
three additional earthquakes are analyzed: one in Peru, one in Algeria, and one in Turkey.  In 
1970, an earthquake with magnitude of 7.9 happened in Peru and caused 530 million US dollars 
in damage (EM-DAT, 2011).  In 1999, an earthquake with magnitude of 7.6 occurred in Turkey 
and caused 40 billion US dollars in damage (Johnson, 2000), and in 1980, a magnitude 7.2 
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earthquake in Algeria caused 5.2 billion US dollars in damage (EM-DAT, 2011).  The damage 
from the earthquakes in Peru, Turkey, and Algeria were then adjusted for inflation so that one 
can easily compare the results in the different countries.  These three values were added onto the 
chart to see if there is a relationship, and the results can be seen in Figure 6-3.  By adding more 
data to the chart, one can more clearly see the relationship between the result of the natural 
hazard and the various stages of economic development.  Despite the fact that the damage in 
Peru, Turkey, and Algeria earthquakes were lower as a percentage of the country‘s GDP 
compared to Haiti‘s earthquake, it is worth pointing out here that the assessment of hazard 
damage in general is difficult.  There were many earthquakes that were considered as destructive, 
but their corresponding damages in terms of number of dollars can only cover part of the 
description.  As many others involved issues, such as: damages in surrounding areas, destruction 
of towns, destruction of community, and dislocation of numerous people, which are difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms. 
 
Figure 6-3.  Damage as percentage of GDP versus GDP per capita with the additional 
information of earthquakes in Peru (1970), Algeria (1980), and Turkey (1999). 
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 As shown in Figure 6-3 above, the damage in Haiti once again stood out dramatically.  In 
particular, the damage from the earthquake in Haiti identified two specific facts: (1) the economy 
of the country itself is so meager, (2) the damage is quite extensive as compared to other 
countries.  The idea behind choosing Peru‘s 1970 earthquake, Algeria 1980 earthquake, and 
Turkey 1999 earthquake here is to emphasize the vulnerability of Haiti with the stage of the 
country‘s economy.  In 1970, the earthquake happened in Peru, the earthquake was considered 
one of the most destructive ones in the world (USGS, 2011f).  Yet the damage from the 
earthquake caused nearly ten percent of the damage done in Haiti, despite the fact that Peru did 
not have seismic code provisions until after the occurrence of this earthquake (USGS, 2011f).  
Sharing the same situation of the absence of seismic codes in the building standard is Algeria 
(Bendimerad, 2004), shown in this chart, the damage in Algeria was 12.3 percent of the GDP of 
the entire country at the time of the hazard occurrence.  Finally, the chart included the damage 
from the earthquake in Turkey (1999) with the idea of connecting the developing countries and 
the developed one in this comparison.  While the results of the hazards in New Zealand were 
recorded in the two different events, one in 2010 and one in 2011.  Yet, the curve is indeed 
dramatically decayed as the economy of the country is increased, but also with the stage of 
development of the building code itself.  Three years after its earthquake, Algeria revised its 
seismic code (Bendimerad, 2004).  Peru revised its seismic code seven years after its earthquake 
(Piche, 2007).  In 1997, prior to the earthquake, the ductile provision for seismic design was 
revised in Turkey (NISEE, 2004).  Damage in Turkey was relatively higher than Algeria and 
Peru due to the value of infrastructure.  The Chile earthquake created a ―kink‖ in the chart caused 
by the fact that the earthquake‘s magnitude is much larger compared to the others, especially 
since earthquake magnitude is measured on a log scale.  In the horizontal axis, the GDP showed 
70 
 
the economy of New Zealand is twice as large as that of Chile, and with the addition of the 
presence of the modern code, the damage was not as intensive relative to the compared countries.   
Presented in Figure 6-4 below is Haiti‘s economy for a ten year period.  As seen in this 
illustration, Haiti‘s economy increased slowly from 2004 to 2009.  This trend was interrupted 
dramatically after the earthquake.  Quite evidently, this disaster negatively impacted the country, 
but in this case, one can also argue that the slow growth of the economy itself over a long period 
of time actually left the country with a worse exposure to risk of disaster.  So the country‘s 
sluggish GDP growth and its exposure to risk are a result of years of accumulated problems.  
Craig (2010) once described Haiti as ―the country that time has left behind‖, and it now quickly 
needs to catch up in order to recover and prevent similar catastrophic events. 
  
Figure 6-4.   Haiti’s GDP over the past eleven years. 
6.2 Impact of politics on human vulnerability.  
Economic strength provides information about the organizational capacity of the government in 
many aspects.  It is worthwhile to look carefully into four specific drivers of growth in Haiti: 
agriculture and rural development, tourism, infrastructure, and science, technology and 
innovation.  In addition, it is time for the Haitian government to realize that their system of 
960
980
1000
1020
1040
1060
1080
1100
1120
1140
1160
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
a
p
it
a
(2
0
1
0
 U
S
 d
o
ll
a
rs
)
Year
Haiti GDP 2000 - 2010 
71 
 
management must be improved since corruption reached a considerable high for the country at 
the end of the year 2008.  One more factor considered controversial at the time of this study is 
whether or not conditions in Haiti after the earthquake have been strongly exacerbated by 
corruption.  Over many years, Transparency International (TI) has researched and surveyed to 
find an indicator measuring how a country exhibits an abuse of entrusted power for private gain 
or encompasses corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors.  The Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) is a scalar number that ranks countries according to the perception of 
corruption in the public sector; the CPI grade increases as the corruption is less within a country.  
The CPI is an aggregate indicator that combines different sources of information about 
corruption, making it possible to compare countries.  The CPI number describes the possible 
reasons for an economy to stay mostly undeveloped over many years.  The relationship of a 
country‘s economy is proportional to the CPI number, as shown in Figure 6-5.  Haiti was graded 
as only 2.2 in the corruption perception index scale.   
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Figure 6-5.  The mean corruption index CPI versus mean gross national income. 
Haiti‘s CPI is very low compared to every other country, making economic progress 
difficult.  The main principle goal of this part of the discussion is to point out one essential 
recommendation for the Haitian‘s government: the need for changing the system of manipulating 
and managing within their country.  Clearly, the problems indicated here are totally out of 
engineers‘ control.  Yet, after any disaster, engineers are involved in the rehabilitation of the 
country and required to address the consequence.  If in these plans, engineering professionals are 
to be effective with the Haitian public, they will need to be aware of their decisions with respect 
to the risk understanding aspect.  Society‘s awareness of sustainability as a whole is crucial, thus 
development in the short term and sustainability in the long term for Haiti‘s future therefore must 
be addressed, so that the requirements of current needs and future development plans can 
become the gears that enable the resilience.  By examining Figure 6-6 below, one can see that the 
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amount of damage experienced during the 2010 was significantly higher in Haiti than in the 
other two countries, whose CPI numbers are much higher.  This relationship should be 
considered one of the factors that affects vulnerability and risk of a country. 
 
 
Figure 6-6 Damage as % of GDP vs. Corruption Perception Index 
 As mentioned in Section 6.2, comparison is needed to include more data.  Therefore, 
three additional countries were added in between the portion of Haiti and Chile.  Again, one can 
see the relationship of social‘s issue to the vulnerability stage of a country as in Figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-7.  Damage as percentage of GDP versus Corruption Perception Index with 
addition data. 
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6.3 Population impact 
One primary factor affecting economic growth in Haiti is the population density, shown in 
Figure 6-8 below.  Haiti‘s population density was 356 people per square kilometer in the year 
2010.  This adds another factor for risk, beside the natural hazards that Haiti is dealing with is the 
daily health risk such as limited access to clean drinking water, lack of sanitation and insufficient 
supplies of food.  The exposure to risk here also stands out with another measurement indicator, 
the overall rise in population.  Consequences of this characteristic include land erosion, pollution 
and technological hazards, and forest degradation which increase vulnerability to natural hazard 
risk (Lundahl, 1991).  
 
Figure 6-8.  Population density over a 10 year period. 
Shown also in the figure are the trends for Chile and New Zealand.  In contrast to Haiti, 
the other two countries actually face a different type of risk: since their population is aging, the 
population growth of these two countries has stopped increasing at a rapid pace.  The scale of the 
chart does not allow one to see the growth of the population in these two countries, but rather, it 
shows how much different the population density of Chile and New Zealand are versus Haiti.   
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The intention here is to illustrate the combined effect of population density and the 
economy together.  As mentioned earlier, the vulnerability from these factors is not only 
impacting the economy itself, but also exposing it to multiple types of risk, primarily caused by 
human vulnerabilities.  Population density, however, can be one of the contributors to the 
country‘s economy due to the fact that labor source is a significant component that can assist the 
country itself.  One example is China, where the labor source is the most supportive role to its 
economy currently (Economist, 2010).  A strict requirement for development in a country with 
such high population density is that that country has to organize its people in such a system with 
proper plans and basic needs.  Port-au-Prince, Haiti and Santiago, Chile have large population 
densities, with over 12% and 28% of the entire country‘s population, respectively.  Now the 
challenge for Haiti is how to decentralize the people as well as jobs and basic needs so that 
people will not group together in one place (Times, 2010).  Prior to the earthquake, much of the 
economic activity in Haiti took place in Port-au-Prince and contributed up to 85% of government 
revenue (EERI, 2010).  Following the decentralization plan will be a need for regulation of the 
country as a whole, so that the economy can evenly improve all over the country, in lieu of 
having 85% focused only in the Port-au-Prince area.  Decentralization is still one of the 
challenges for Haiti, along with many other aspects.  Decentralization and creating jobs can be 
considered the first steps for Haiti to guide development in the whole country more 
systematically. 
6.4 Loss of Life and Resistance Capacity  
When the catastrophic earthquake occurred in Haiti, it appeared to lead the community to 
instability, shock, and reduced resilience capacity.  The lives lost in the event serve as a metric of 
the performance of the country‘s hazard resistance capacity.  Haiti touched the whole world after 
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the 2010 earthquake, when there were over 300,000 lives lost.  As mentioned previously, the loss 
of lives also signifies a great loss of skill, knowledge and capability of the entire society.  The 
impacts from economy do not only apply to resilience capacity of a community but also onto the 
resistance capacity of that community as well.  The relationship between loss of lives and 
economy in GDP is graphed in Figure 6-9.  This trend is actually similar to the previous chart.  
The curve decays dramatically as the GDP of a country increases.  In Figure 6-9a, the ratio of 
loss of life to the population of the whole country was used.  One question is: would it be 
reasonable to use the number of victims compared to the population of the whole country to 
graph versus the economy?  If the number of victims were compared in a larger country with 
commensurately larger population, for instance China, then the definition of risk exposure would 
be dimished because of the large total population.  To avoid this, the risk was also defined as a 
percentage that reflected the impacted population.  The value graphed in Figure 6-9b is the ratio 
of loss of lives for the exposed population within the area of significant earthquake shaking.
  
Figure 6-9.  a. Life loss as % of population vs. GDP per capita.  b. Life loss as % of affected 
population vs. GDP per capita. 
The life loss curve in Figure 6-10 represented a smoother relationship.  The relationship 
here points out one fact that the vulnerability of a community (Haiti, for instance) is relatively 
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larger as the economy of the country itself is weaker.  Yet, there is also an inconsistent 
perspective view of this relationship; it is the dependence on the particular area in each country.  
Nevertheless, there appears to be a stronger relationship between the state of economy and 
human vulnerability toward risk than the dollar value of damage experienced. 
 
Figure 6-10.  Relationship of causalities as a percentage of affected population and GDP 
per capita  
6.5 Economic History and Resilience Capacity (a year after the earthquake)  
A major obstacle in implementing a plan to reduce the exposure toward risks is that it requires 
observation of a country‘s activity over time.  Understanding resilience capacity of a country is 
part of the risk exposure reduction plan.  One of the simplest observations is by looking at the 
country‘s economy over a period of time.  A common definition for resilience in society is a 
measure of the time needed to enable the economy to recover to pre-event levels.  Again, given 
the development represented by the measurement of the GDP, the resilience capacity of the three 
countries is investigated.  The resilience concept is based on the performance of the whole union 
of society, politics, and economy.  All three earthquakes happened in 2010, and a full year has 
passed for Chile and Haiti‘s cases, but for New Zealand less than six months have passed at the 
time of this study.  Accordingly, the economic statistics of 2010 have been recorded, and again 
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play an important role in deciding the resiliency capacity of the society as a whole.  Shown in 
Figures 6-11a, 6-11b, and 6-11c are the trends of three countries‘ economies.  
  
 
Figure 6-11. a. New Zealand's GDP. b. Chile's GDP. c. Haiti's GDP 
Incident points are the drop down portions in the year 2010, the time after the earthquake.  
The GDP dropped away from the slope of its trend from the year 2000 till the end of the year 
2009.  An encouraging part in Figures 6-11a and 6-11b is that the GDP of New Zealand and 
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Chile in 2010 were trending upward and increased above pre-earthquake levels.  On the other 
hand, Haiti‘s economy has experienced a continual downward period (see Figure 6-11c).   
Resilience to natural hazards is the ability of a community to adapt to hazardous stresses 
(Pelling, 2010).  Resilience also appears as the degree of production of planned preparation 
undertaken in the light of potential and spontaneous response to hazard.  So, in order to indicate 
a resilience capacity, the resilience has to be a measurement factor.  In this case, the ability of a 
country to develop its economy after a hazardous disturbance is used as that factor.  Taking this 
concept into consideration, the resilience capacity of New Zealand and Chile showed positive 
increasing slopes on the graphs as seen on Figure 6-11a and 6-11b.  A commonly asked question 
is: what are the details of the resilience capacity indicated by these positive slopes shown on the 
graphs that allowed Chile and New Zealand to overcome the impacts caused by the earthquakes? 
Clearly, Haiti‘s economy actually shrank 8 percent by the damage done in Port-au-Prince 
(CIA, 2011), which is likely less than what one could imagine, despite much help, and debts 
voided by the World Bank.  In terms of the concept of resilience, the path of the last two years in 
Haiti reduced as a slope of -92, shown in Figure 6-12c.  Or, one could argue based on 
reconnaissance team reports that according to the reduction amount, Haiti‘s economy indeed 
dropped vertically and has not increased for the past year, as illustrated as a dashed line.  So the 
risk is actually larger in the future since Haiti will need a considerable amount of time to get its 
economy back to the level of the past trend from the year 2000 to 2009.  Resilience capacity in 
Haiti will need more time to indicate whether the country‘s economic activity can return to its 
previous trajectory. 
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In contrast to Haiti, the economy in Chile prior to the earthquake experienced a deficit 
from the years 2008 till 2009, shown in Figure 6-11b.  During this period, the country‘s 
investments dropped about 7 billion dollars by the end of 2009.  Chile‘s independent wealth 
fund, amounting to more than $20 billion, was kept mostly outside of the country and separated 
from the central Bank reserve.  During this period, the Chilean government conducted a rule-
based countercyclical fiscal policy.  The rule accumulated surpluses in sovereign wealth funds, 
and allowed deficit spending only during periods of low copper prices and growth (CIA, 2010).  
At the beginning of the year 2009, Chile‘s economy started to show signs of a rebound.  Despite 
the impact of one of the largest earthquakes in its history, Chile‘s economy had increased by 5.3 
percent by the year 2010.  In the concept of resilience capacity, this positive increase plays a 
significant role in the capability of the whole community.  In fact, this slope represents the ability 
to move the country away from environmental risks. 
Unlike Haiti, New Zealand controlled the shock quite well.  New Zealand recognized the 
principal of controlling its resilience by using an insurance mechanism.  At the time of the 2010 
earthquake occurrence, more than 70 percent of the New Zealand population had insurance that 
covered environmental risks.  This was the key tool in New Zealand that helped the country.  
Insurance represented an action that reflected the public educational background on preparation 
and planning to reduce the human vulnerability toward risks.  One important aspect in New 
Zealand was the behavior of structures during numerous aftershocks.  The behavior during 
aftershocks of structures that have experienced damage in a major earthquake is a topic for future 
research, even in America.  As mentioned previously, New Zealand is subject to many 
earthquakes and aftershocks caused by the seismicity geography.  New Zealand in general, and 
Christchurch in particular, must face the decision whether or not to spend a great amount of 
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money in constructing ―earthquake proof‖ buildings so that earthquakes cannot have a significant 
impact on them.  From an engineering and economic point of view, this is an irony about 
building codes, in which costs to ―earthquake proof‖ structures may never be utilized.  Using the 
damage to pre-1968s buildings in New Zealand as an example, the need of replacing these aging 
facility or even retrofitting often times gets pushed aside by more urgent issues—after all, money 
is in short supply.  However, it is important to bring all buildings—new and old—up to date with 
the law because earthquakes cannot be predicted ahead of time and it is too late to think about 
retrofitting a building after such an event.  In contrast with Chile, the economy in New Zealand 
did not increase as much after the earthquake as that of Chile‘s.  However, the economy in New 
Zealand did not decrease as much as that of Haiti‘s as a result of the earthquake.  The level of 
stability of each country‘s economy is reflected by its ability to resist being affected by disasters 
as well as its ability to recover from them.  It is somewhat interesting to realize that the slopes 
before and after the shocks are similar or very close to each other in the case of Chile.  
Examining a snapshot from the last five years from 2005 to 2010, shown in Figure 6-12 a, b, and 
c respectively, is very interesting, and more study of the effect of the state of the economy on 
resilience is warranted.   
82 
 
 
 
Figure 6-12.  a. New Zealand's GDP . b. Chile's GDP. c. Haiti's GDP 
Observation from the trend of the three graphs above shows the aspects of the economy 
that can protect the people of Chile and New Zealand.  Having a developed economy perhaps 
also helps the community to be able to establish and enforce proper building codes.  The result of 
having a developed economy is so obvious that one can even observe that it enhances the 
education by a large scale, for instance New Zealand‘s community aware the help from having 
insurance.  Sustainability in Haiti has been a challenge over the years, it is important for Haiti‘s  
dy /dx= 611
dy/dx = 1680
25000
26000
27000
28000
29000
30000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011G
D
P
 p
er
 C
ap
it
a 
(2
0
1
0
 U
S
 d
o
ll
ar
s)
Year
New Zealand GDP 2005- 2010 
dy/dx = 841
dy/dx= 760
12000
12500
13000
13500
14000
14500
15000
15500
2005 2007 2009 2011
G
D
P
 p
er
 C
ap
it
a 
(2
0
1
0
 U
S
 d
o
ll
ar
s)
Year
Chile GDP 2005 - 2010
dy /dx= 47
dy/dx = -92.1
1000
1020
1040
1060
1080
1100
1120
1140
1160
2005 2007 2009 2011
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
(2
0
1
0
 U
S
 d
o
ll
ar
s)
Year
Haiti GDP 2005 - 2010
83 
 
government to swiftly realize what issues are the top priorities for them to reconstruct their 
systems.  This will enhance development within the country‘s economy, and the establishment of 
a seismic standard can be a subsequent task. 
6.6 Value of Infrastructure  
Damage during the earthquakes has been expressed up to this point as a fraction of the economy 
of the country, which is assumed to reflect the development of that country in terms of 
infrastructure.  The premise is that the larger the amount of damage as a fraction of GDP, the 
worse preparation the country had.  Similar to the number of loss of lives, however, an 
alternative approach is to consider the absolute value of the damage.  For Chile the amount of 
damage during the earthquake was about 31 billion US dollars, which is the highest number 
compared to the other countries.  The reason is not from poor preparation of the country prior to 
the natural hazard; instead it is in terms of the high value of the existing infrastructure.  As 
shown in Figure 6-13 below, the three countries‘ damages scatter instead of correlating in a 
certain order.   
 
Figure 6-13.  Damage as a total amount versus GDP per capita 
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The earthquake caused the highest amount of damage in Chile; this amount of damage 
included the values of roads, bridges, ports, and houses.  The Chilean government will spend an 
additional $1 billion on emergency relief measures.  Public sector damage (e.g., hospitals and 
schools) will amount to $9 billion (US Department of State, 2011).  The amount of damage 
included 33 percent just from the damage to schools and hospitals.  So the percentage of damage 
from roads, bridges, houses, permanent losses such as economic losses (loss of production, 
reduction in turnover, loss of employment and salaries, increased costs of production, etc.) was 
67 percent.   
Unlike Chile, damage in Haiti was mostly from the cost of houses, explicitly, most 
damage and losses were experienced by the private sector.  The amount of damage for the 
private sector was $5.5 billion, or equivalent to of 70 percent of the total damage.  The public 
sector impact was $2.4 billion, or 30 percent of the total.  The value of destroyed physical assets-
-including housing units, schools, hospitals, buildings, roads and bridges, ports, and airports--
was estimated at $4.302 billion, which is 55 percent of the total of all effects of the disaster.  In 
addition, economic losses (which mainly occurred in Port-au-Prince) reached $3.561 billion, or 
45 percent of the total.  Within the amount of $4.302 billion, housing was the sector most 
affected by the earthquake, with damages estimated around $2.3 billion.  Loss from trade due to 
damages was $639 million, or 8 percent of the total.  Losses from transport and government 
buildings were $595 million each, and the loss of roads equivalents to 8 percent of the total 
damage (US Department of State, 2011).  Clearly, the amount of damage from houses is 
considerable, which places a concern in the willingness to pay within the society such as through 
an insurance mechanism, the concept of which appeared to be nearly non-existent at the time of 
the state of emergency.   
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To stay consistent with previous parts, the total damage once again is plotted in terms of 
the value of structures only.  Here, in Figure 6-14, the amount of damage in Haiti, Peru, and 
Algeria implies the possible destruction of the earthquake to the available infrastructure, in 
Turkey and Chile, the dollar value of damage was much higher since there were more structures 
built.  New Zealand again stayed out of this range since the economy of the country is much 
more developed than the other four countries and its building code was more enhanced.   
 
Figure 6-14.  Damage as total amount versus GDP per capita (2011 US dollars). 
6.7 Summary 
It is important to emphasize that among all the challenges faced by the Haitian people, risk 
management is the most complex.  To be able to manage risk, Haiti should clearly be aware of 
the needs for managing its risk, including short term needs and long term needs.  Using the 
rubble removal in Haiti as an example, based on the estimate by DesRoches, the time needed to 
clear the rubble is the range of 3 to 5 years (DesRoches, 2010).  At the time of writing this paper, 
it is a year from the date of the disaster, and Haiti has only cleared 20 percent of the rubble 
(Rodgers, 2011).  This percentage of removal seems trivial, but the challenge Haiti is faced with 
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is the high possibility of having another disturbance—an earthquake or a hurricane—that would 
cause the country to reach a ―paralysis‖ condition of rubble removal such as if this condition had 
happened during the middle of the year 2010 (Rodgers, 2011).  So to get to the trajectory of the 
activity before the earthquake or to bring up the resilience, Haiti‘s revival (not only in 
particularly rubble removal) still needs time and extra help from countries around the world. 
Since natural hazards will always exist as a threat against the country, Haiti needs a plan 
to rebuild, reorganize, and prepare their country for the disaster.  Based on the above analysis, 
rehabilitation of Haiti‘s people and repairing the country‘s critical infrastructure is their first 
priority.  Rehabilitation of the people requires an organized system and cannot be considered 
only the temporary solution.  If Haiti can organize the small community system, then such 
activity can do the same to the larger scale of society.  Once the people are adequately secured, 
the country can then concentrate their resources in disaster mitigation.  However, for this to 
occur, the Haitians are required to combine their effort to help revitalize their country for their 
own sake.  
Shown in the above analysis, there is a relationship between damage and economy, 
between political system and damage, and between population and damage.  If vulnerability is an 
outcome of the combination of factors that include economic, societal, and political systems, 
then what type of factors are engaged in the potential for risk reduction?  In the next chapter, this 
question will be answered with a summary of high points and supporting illustrations. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
7.1 Remarks 
While it is useful to have a picture of the susceptibilities of Haiti by looking at its social and 
political histories, it is imperative to have a dialogue between the different parties involved in the 
society to reduce risks and plan for future disasters.  Collaboration between the analysis and 
reconstruction of Haiti go hand in hand.  A reminder of the impact of a natural hazard—an 
earthquake in this case—is made by Tom Paulay (2011) who said that "seismic design is a 
solemn responsibility."  Perhaps the meaning of responsibility here is that every party—the 
scientists, the engineers, and the government—have a duty to help their country both prepare for 
and recover from a disaster.  Thus, it is time for every sector of the community to put together 
the needed efforts to push their responsibility toward revival of the country. 
 A summary of the concern of this thesis is well represented by Figure 7-1.  This figure 
shows the measure of activity (for example, GDP per person) within a community over time.  
The measure of activity of the society prior to the earthquake is assumed to be approximated as a 
straight line, and the occurrence of the disaster event causes the incidence point.  The trajectories 
of recovery depend upon the resilience of the society.  At the occurrence of the disaster, the 
influence of society, politics and the economy have a profound effect on the magnitude of the 
damage suffered in the community.  The drop in activity will certainly be influenced by the 
robustness of the community‘s built infrastructure, a direct reflection of the effective 
incorporation of design for low probability, high consequence hazards in the building code, and 
the enforcement of that code.  Of equal significance, the participation between engineers and 
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society during the recovery phase determines the time and trajectory for the communities to 
reach a point of recovery. 
  
Figure 7-1.  Community activity and recovery over time ( Corotis, 2011) 
 The integrated difference between the projected trajectory and the actual recovery 
trajectory is a convenient measure of the lack of resilience of a society.  This area is a 
combination of numerous factors, which are dependent upon the development level of the 
country and the risk level acceptance within the country itself.  In particular, they are: 
1. Stability of democracy. 
 The stability of democracy depends on the involvement of society and politics 
with the development of a community.  It is an important idea that reflects the 
strength of the government, and this was almost completely absent in Haiti‘s 
system. 
2. Health of social fairness reflected in measurement of corruption. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the measurement of corruption reflects how a country 
which exhibits an abuse of entrusted power for private gain or encompasses 
corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors negatively affects the 
growth and progression of that country.  There is a close relationship of this 
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measurement to the economy of a country.  The change in system of governance 
can provide opportunity to enhance the adaptive potential of a community to 
improve the economy. 
3. Stability of population along with land usage and forest preservation. 
 Rapid increase in population and frequently dealing with natural hazards such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes increase the human susceptibility to the hazard.  
Consequences of this over-rise in population characteristic led to land erosion, 
pollution, technological hazards, and forest degradation which increase 
vulnerability to natural hazard risk (Lundahl, 1991).  The evidence of this aspect 
is that as of 2008, Haiti has destroyed almost all of its forests, in contrast to its 
neighbor on the Island, the Dominican Republic. 
4. Even geographical distribution of employment. 
 If Port-au-Prince was not so congested and Haiti did not rely almost completely 
on Port-au-Prince for its economic activity, then the economic impact of the 
earthquake would be smaller.  As a result, the decentralization proposal for 
reconstruction, although a challenge, could help reduce future economic risk from 
natural hazards. 
5. Establishment of building standards, especially for seismic areas, along with 
enforcement. 
 One of the obvious reasons for Haiti‘s devastating damage was the absence of 
building standard.  Yet, Haiti is not the only country that suffers from the lack of a 
building standard and enforcement, Viet-Nam is one of just many examples.  
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Even though Viet-Nam does not belong to a seismic area, establishment of 
building standards for similar countries including Haiti itself is a must.   
6. Improvement of material qualifications and construction specifications. 
 There is a close connection between material qualifications, construction 
specifications, and structural response during the earthquake.  This relationship 
needs an establishment of enforcement. 
7. Progression of public education, including in terms of insurance mechanisms. 
 Awareness of the existence of risk and its impacts to a community is difficult to 
extend; to be prepared for its consequent occurrence is the most challenging 
aspect of risk mitigation.  Public education of the risks of the hazard is currently 
underdeveloped in Haiti.  In addition, 30 % of New Zealand‘s population does not 
have insurance to cover disasters like earthquakes (RMS, 2010).  A lack of 
understanding of the probability of risks to occur at any given time is severe.  For 
instance, sociological studies have demonstrated that people often think that the 
difference from 0% to 1% of probability is greater than the difference from 35% 
to 36 % (Patt and Zekhauser, 2002), it is clear that knowledge in probability is 
needed, particularly in an area that is subjected to frequent occurrences events 
from natural hazards.  This concept should not only apply to Haiti itself, but also 
to Chile, and other countries around the world. 
8. Application of a simple method to be used in a developing country such as a dampened 
base isolator for structures (an adapted idea from Professor Sivaselvan, 2011) 
 While base isolator applications have been a topic for research, it appears that this 
type of structural foundation is complicated to implicate and is relatively 
91 
 
expensive to install in a developing country.  It would therefore be more efficient 
to have a simple design of a dampened base isolator structure for a developing 
country to use. 
As all these factors are involved in the development of a community, the result from any 
one deficiency is considerable, as seen in the devastation of Haiti after the earthquake.  With the 
memory of the earthquake still fresh in people‘s minds, this is the time when all these factors 
need to be improved.  As seen in the previous chapters, the relationship between the economy, 
society, and the government directly affects the resilience capacity within the community.  Since 
both the quantity and quality of economic resources are very important, the risk level that a 
developed economy accepts is reflected in the economic stage of development of the country 
itself.  But if the memory of the earthquake fades from people‘s minds, the country might never 
recover from the disaster—after all, what would be the motivation to improve on these factors if 
everyone forgot what has happened in the past?   
a. Future research topic suggestion  
There are many other factors that this paper did not cover because of time constraints and 
information-dependent conditions.  For instance, the case study using structural software to 
model the Chancery Former US Embassy and performing a seismic analysis on the model was 
incomplete because of the lack of precise behavior of the masonry infill structures that were very 
common when the building was built in the 1950s.  In addition, the seismic hazard curve from 
the time the structure was built is very different from the one from the 2010 earthquake; 
therefore, it is very challenging to perform a seismic analysis on this particular building.  Despite 
this insufficient information, demonstration of a building that was designed based on a seismic 
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standard was able to be presented; thus, its behavior during the earthquake was able to be 
captured and contrasted.  The results from natural hazards are unpredictable and completely 
dependent on the level of risk a community accepts.  Therefore, to quantify this result in term of 
structural behavior of certain structures, it is necessary to have a precise design hazard curve 
from accurate ground motion data.  The same argument can be made for the resilience capacity 
analyzed in chapter 6.   
It is inadequate to conclude that the result from the earthquake in Haiti was due solely to 
the country‘s poor economy; thus, further analysis should be done in order to complete the 
picture of risk management needs and reductions of human susceptibilities to natural hazards, 
including hurricanes.  In addition, application of methods to represent damage of natural hazards 
in a better way which can quantify the loss of community‘s value, destruction of towns, or 
impact of economic loss in particular areas is necessary.  While calculation is based on the 
specific data in references, it is not ideal to point out solely the relationship of vulnerability and 
stage of economy since each area or community within a country contributes differently to the 
country‘s economy.  A normalized contribution of each damaged area is needed, as well as the 
losses within a community and impact of large scale dislocation should be included as well. 
A recommended focus could be the enforcement system in the country‘s implementation 
of codes, the code comparison between Chile and the United States, particularly in masonry 
design, or the impacts of natural hazard frequency of occurrence on structural behavior.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, the impact of natural hazard frequency is somber: for instance, at the 
time of finishing this thesis, an earthquake with Mw magnitude 6.3 occurred in New Zealand on 
February 24, 201, causing 160 deaths according to current estimates by the BBC (as of 3-2-11).  
A common question is why something like that could happen while the occurrence of a 
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magnitude 7.1 in the same area caused no deaths.  Part of the answer is that the second 
earthquake had a different epicenter location and depth, characteristics not reflected in a single 
number such as the magnitude, which is commonly used to quantify the impacts.  Another part of 
the answer is that retrofitting often needs time to make upgrades or changes.  It will be best to 
update buildings whether or not they collapsed as a result of the design spectrum.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to determine which design response spectrum was used when these buildings were 
constructed. 
b. Close up 
In conclusion, the paper presents an investigation on the underlying relationship between the 
implicit level of risk accepted for natural hazard vulnerability, and the level of economic, social 
and political development of the country.  In addition, a list of the differences among the three 
events, as well as commentary on some of the social aspects that led to the conditions at the time 
of the earthquakes, has been made.  With the variables considered such as the magnitude of 
earthquake, depth of the hypocenter, local geological conditions, demographics of the 
population, population at risk in the area of the earthquake, and performance of structures in the 
affected areas, one can form a good estimate of how a particular earthquake would affect the 
community.  Vulnerability information is also related to the seismic provisions of the building 
codes, and the atmosphere of code enforcement.  As damage has been and is continuing to be 
investigated by several countries concerning the loss of lives, injury, property damage, and how 
well various structures have performed in the country, more data will become available so that 
more research can be done on this subject.  In addition, there should be studies that would help 
lead Haiti to depend more on itself after a disaster, rather than to desperately and constantly rely 
on aid from foreign countries (O‘Connor, 2011).  Finally, after such a disaster, the people of 
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Haiti deserve better conditions than those they are experiencing currently, and it is both an 
obligation and opportunity of the foreign community to help them reach that goal. 
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Appendix 1.  Building layout  
 
 
Table1. Building information.
Building Information Value Units Notes
Building Length 118 ft N-S
Building Width 88.2 ft E-W
Building Height 21 ft total
Area 10408 ft2 per floor
Orignal building with concrete frame, walls, and steel panels
Figure1. Building Layout
APPENDIX 1
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Stone
Concrete masonry unit
Steel panels
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Appendix 2.  Design spectrum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Design Spectrum from the Model by Modal Response Spectra Analysis
APENDIX 2
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Appendix 3.  Period check, shear check. 
 
Table1. Approximate period
Building Approximated Period Reference
hn(ft) 21.3 total height
Ct(CMRF) 0.016 ASCE12.8-2
x 0.9 ASCE12.8-3
Ta(s)=Ct*hn
x 0.251 min value
Ta(s)=CuTa 0.351 ASCE12.8-7
Tn((s)(from model) 0.49 MIDAS
Table2. Mapping coefficient
Location and mapping coefficients: Units Reference
Ss 1.069 g USGS,2010
S1(s) 0.68 g USGS,2010
Site class D ASCE11.4-1 USGS,2010
Fa 1 g ASCE11.4-1
Fv 1.5 g ASCE11.4-1
SMS=FaSs 1.069 g ASCE11.4-1
SM1=FvS1 1.02 g ASCE11.4-2
SDS=2/3SMS 0.713 g ASCE11.4-3
SD1=2/3SM1 0.68 g ASCE11.4-4
Table3. Seismic  coefficient
Seismic Coefficients Value Notes/References
R 8 ASCE12.2-1
Redundancy factor p 1.3  ASCE 12.3.4.2
I factor 1
Cs 0.089083 SDS/(R/I)
Cs,max 0.173469 SD1/(TR/I) Control
Cs,min 0.0425 0.5S1/(R/I) Ss>0.6g
Cd , Drift amplification 5.5 ASCE 12.2.1
Table 4. Building information
Building Information Value Units Notes
Building Length 117.6 ft N-S
Building Width 88.2 ft E-W
Building Height 21.3 ft total
Area 10372 ft2 per floor
APPENDIX 3
Important factor catergory I
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Table5. Distributed load assign for MIDAS model
Load Value Units
Roof Live Load 10 psf
Roof Dead Load 120 psf
Floor Live Load 25 psf
Floor Dead Load 150 psf
Base Shear Force: Value Units
W-roof 1141 kips
W-floor 1037 kips
W-total 2178 kips
Vs,base 378 kips
Shear Force at each Floor
k= 1
Vs= 378 kips---> BASE SHEAR
Floor h(ft) W(kips) Wxhx
k Cvx
Roof 21.6 1141 24645 0.70
1st Floor 10.3 1037 10683 0.30
346 0 0.00
ΣWxhx
k 35328 1
Table7. Compare with MIDAS
Floor F(kips) 1.05*F(kips) Fmodel(kips)%Difference
Roof 264 277 266 4.0
1st Floor 114 120 122 -1.7
BASE SHEAR 378 397 388 2.3
ASCE 12.812
beams carry selfweights
ASCE 12.8.1
Cs*W
Notes/References
beams carry selfweights
Table6. Base Shear calculation to compare with MIDAS in ELF method
Notes/References
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Appendix 4.  Load Pattern 
 
 
 
Figure1. Dead load distribution (k/ft)
Figure2. Live load distribution(k/ft)
Figure3. Live load distribution(k/ft)
Table1. Distributed load assign for MIDAS model
Load Value Units Distributed in Midas Units
Roof Live Load 10 psf 1.00E-01 k/sf
Roof Dead Load 64 psf 6.35E-01 k/sf
Floor Live Load 25 psf 2.50E-01 k/sf
Floor Dead Load 50 psf 5.00E-01 k/sf
The weight of beams, columns, and wall elements is included separately in MIDAS
included in the category "Self weight of structure."
APPENDIX 4
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Appendix 5.  Story drift check, Story stability check 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5
Table1.  Inter-story Drift Comparison Story Drift Check:
ASCE Table 12.12-1
Story ELF model MRSA modelratio(EFL) ratio(MRSA) Occupancy I
Roof 0.278 0.169 0.012 0.007 Allowable Drift:
Floor 1 0.172 0.100 0.007 0.004 0.020hsx in
Table 2. Story Drift from ELF and MRSA
Story Drift(in)
Story Stability Check:
θ= PxΔ
Vx hsxCd
Px total unfactored vertical design load at and above level x
Δ story drift based on ΔS acting between levels x and x-1
Vx design seismic shear force acting between levels x and x-1
hsx story height below level x
θ stability coefficient
Cd deflection amplification factor
Table 3. Story Stability Coefficient Checking from ELF and MRSA
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Appendix 6.  Capacity check for beams
 
APPENDIX 6
Capacity in Beam( Random check)
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Appendix 7.  Capacity check for ColumnsAPPENDIX 7
Capacity in column, random check
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Appendix 8.  Strong Column-Weak Beam CheckAPPENDIX 8
Strong column-Weak beam Check
Ductile design  Check
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Strong Col-Weak Beam concept Reference
?Mncol > 1.2?Mnb ACI 21.4.2.2
Hand Calculation checking
Node Axis load Mncol(kft)Cw Mnb(kft) Ratio Ccw Mnc(kft) Ratio min Ratio
67 Local z clCB2 439 234 1.88 303 1.45 1.45
59 Local z clCB1 675 234 2.88 303 2.22 2.22
Node min Ratio Need Check
67 1.45 > 1.2 = OK
59 2.22 > 1.2 = OK
